POLICE AND GOVERNMENT MUST LEAD BY EXAMPLE WHEN IT COMES TO THE 'RULE OF LAW'
24 September 2011
by
Penny Bright
If there are two groups of people who citizens should expect to follow the 'RULE OF LAW' - then surely they are the police and judges.
As the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights states,
"Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law."
It is NOT ok in a supposedly 'free and democratic' society - for NZ Police or Judges to act unlawfully - then get the Government to pass retrospective legislation to effectively legitimise their unlawful behaviour.
If the Police evidence was unlawfully obtained then it should not be allowed to be used.
If the law is seen to be inadequate, then surely the answer must be to go through proper lawful 'due process' in order to get the law changed - after a full consultation / select committee process. If Police and Judges can just do as they please - without themselves following the law - then what's the difference between them and the 'criminals', who are being 'investigated' for their alleged 'law-breaking'?
Retroactively changing the law does not hold the Police and Judges accountable for their unlawful actions.
How can the public have confidence in the Police, Judges or the Government - if the 'Rule of Law' is not upheld and unlawful 'bad behaviour' is not only excused but retrospectively legitimised?
In my considered opinion, it is high time full credit was given to NZ's foremost 'Whistleblower' on judicial corruption, and the lack of judicial transparency and accountability in this country.
I am referring to someone who I consider to be a fellow 'Public Watchdog' on judicial matters - Vince Siemer.
Vince Siemer is the only person sentenced to prison for proceedings connected with the Urewera 17 - and he is not even a party. He was sentenced to 6 weeks jail for 'contempt of court' for breaching Chief High Court Judge Winkelmann's supposed 'Court Order' that the Urewera 17 defendants were to be denied their right to trial by jury and the public was not allowed to know about this.
Small technical point - there is no section in any New Zealand Act which permits a Judge to suppress a criminal judgment or the reasons for it.
Solicitor-General David Collins QC initiated the 'contempt' proceedings against Vince Siemer for publishing Judge Winkelmann's judgment denying trial by jury for the 18 formerly accused Urewera defendants.
Apparently, this is the first time ever, in any lawful democracy, that a third party publisher has been sentenced to imprisonment for breaching an order suppressing the public's right to know a judgment in a criminal proceeding.
Our NZ 'justice' system needs three 'systems' changes that would transform it -
1) An enforceable 'Code of Conduct' for NZ Judges. (Based upon the 'Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct' - an international 'best practice' Code of Conduct made by Judges for Judges. )
2) A 'Register of Pecuniary Interests' for NZ Judges.
3) Court proceedings must be recorded, and copies made available to parties who request them.
How can 'justice be done and be seen to be done' - when there is no record in court of what was done? How can a 'court of record' not keep a record?
Penny Bright. Independent 'Public Watchdog' candidate for Epsom.
13 Percent of Fathers Who Apply For Custody Get It. I'm One.
24 April 2010
The belief that the Family Court is there to support children and parents is a fallacy. It has become little more than a cash cow for lawyers, judges and social workers who prey on separation of the child for their own personal financial benefit. Sure, there are some lawyers and
social workers with a genuine interest in what is best for the child, but the system is geared to financially reward those Family Court agents who identify problems.
The fact that 400,000 children go home every night to a fatherless home is testament to social engineering on a grand scale which has been allowed to continue aggressively under the Labour government for the last nine years.
How has this been allowed to happen you may ask? Let me explain, for what purpose does this serve. Mayhem, and control by the state to control it's citizens by increasing the underclass who become dependent on the state for welfare, depriving fathers the opportunity to be a part of their children's lives through child support, thereby not being able to see them through the state making one parent responsible for the financial affairs of the children and the mother.
It is a widely known that once a mother gets on the DPB she has a hand out for life so long as she remains the primary care giver. How does this work? For a start, you need to make sure the father gets no more than 141 days a year and is responsible for child support. A woman can earn with two dependent children upwards of $600 a week on the DPB. Why would any person want to come off that gravy train?
My experience of four years is indeed an insight into how the system destroys families and, in particular, children and fathers who commit suicide at an alarming rate. A while back I got a hold of Mike McRoberts from TV3 in the foyer and hit him up for some hard answers. His reply was "We are not allowed to deal with anything that involves the Family Court." It is true that Judges' make pervasive suppression orders over most of what occurs in the Family Courts. But our children and fathers are dying. The fourth estate in New Zealand is content to fiddle while Rome burns.
The most crucial element to obtain control of the child, or children, is to ensure that the mother claims custody thus claim to child support. The next step is to punish the father by way of making access difficult or lay claim to child abuse - or worse, sexual contact - and failing this, false allegations of assault. I have had to overcome all of the above in my battle to see my son. While doing this, and following up with application after application, his mother's lawyers stalled for time when we got into court. Domestic Violence Orders are an effective tool in neutralising fathers.
Mine was like many cases, where the custodial parent ratcheted up allegations of antagonistic behaviour by the aggrieved and loving father to the point where it takes superhuman strength to suppress the instinct of retaliation. In comes the court-appointed lawyer for the child, and you are now being interviewed by psychologists and psychiatrists who have an uncanny ability to sum you up after one two-hour visit. This opinion is put before the courts, ensuring the process can take up to two years before resolution.
My interview was done by a motherless lesbian. Most loving fathers by this time have been destroyed, give up the fight and submit to a meager existence because the soul and spirit have been broken by the Family Court and its processes.
They can no longer afford lawyers bills, the stress of the fighting and trying to maintain an orderly existence and see the children and maintain child support. Many leave the country or have nothing to do with their kids. The children are never taken into account. In my son's case, he was kidnapped by his mother for 31 days before I got into court. Now I believe firmly this was done with express consent of her lawyer so that I would react and snatch him from his mother's house - as he was taken from his daycare and not returned.
My son had no contact with me at all during this time. After making applications to have a Protection Order placed on me and applying for supervised visits at a Barnados centre of only two hours a week, his mother followed up by visiting the Police Station in Newmarket 14 days after the alleged assault.
The problem was, there wasn't an assault. The long and short was I obtained shared care 50/50, and the mother spent in excess of $30-40,000 on a lawyer keeping a child away from a loving father. Lawyer for Child are leeches and are paid huge sums of money to act in the interests of the child. However, they act in the interests of the financial benefits of prolonging situations that keep them employed. I know one Lawyer who has fifty clients. Could one woman possibly work in the best interests of all of these families or is she just clipping the ticket?
I believe if we look at statistics today we can correlate much of the social fabric breaking down due to lack of fathering, dependent mothers and the morally wrong approach of more children means more state aid and who cares who the father is!
Judge Peter Boshier is a hypocrite. He enjoys fostering women's meetings, when in reality children have been misplaced and left to their own devises to survive the horror of family court incompetence. Why are they hypocrites, well they destroy lives Monday to Friday and go church on Sunday to be pious and conceited in that they think they have made a difference, tell that to the tax payer who is covering the $600 million for all these up and coming criminals who never got the chance for a decent caring father.
I got my son and I made a difference to a child's life. I am not about to stop there.
Brent Matches
Family Court Veteran.
WHY IS SUICIDE IN NEW ZEALAND HIGHEST IN THE WORLD WHEN MEDIA DOES NOT REPORT SUICIDE?
16 March 2010
By Anthony Ravlich
Various 'outsider' Non Government Organizations are planning a television program to discuss the high rate of youth suicide in New Zealand which last September's OECD report stated was the highest amongst its member States.
Replublican Party Leader Kerry Bevin, who is collecting signatures to send to parliament, states there is a high level of concern amongst New Zealanders of 'all walks of life' at the suicide rate. Mr Bevin is one of the organizers of the planned television program and can be contacted by anyone interested in taking part in the television show panel, or as part of the audience, by phoning (09) 473 3747.
Our council, the Human Rights Council Inc. (New Zealand) is also involved. Presently chairperson of the council, I have been a human rights advocate, writing about New Zealand and the United Nations for nineteen years ( my book, 'Freedom from our social prisons', is now on an official UN website
http://hrbaportal.org/?page_id=3180 despite my harsh criticisms of that organization).
In my informed view, one essential cause of many of our social problems is the creation of a class society which has been permitted by the surprising exclusion of non-discrimination on the grounds of social origin (social status at birth) from our domestic human rights law. Also I consider that this discrimination has been condoned by the United Nations and global elites.
Among other very serious effects on New Zealand society this discrimination has denied the children of beneficiaries (generally considered to have a lower social status at birth) from receiving the same in-work tax credit of about $60 per week as the children of working families (see the Child Poverty Action Group website who state about 200,000 children are affected). It has also allowed a 'so-called liberal' elite of 'born to rule', middle class professionals, who hide their control from the people using traditional 'divide and rule' methods, to considerably privilege members of the middle classes over those with ability contributing to the mass exodus of New Zealand 'tall poppies' (including 'tall poppies' in the middle classes) to live overseas. This elite essentially regards human rights as their intellectual property and have managed to 'dumb down' the New Zealand population. According to the New Zealand Human Rights Commission, successive Governments have failed to fund section 5(a) of the Human Rights Act 1993 which requires that the Commission educate people in human rights. Without this understanding people lacked the ability to properly defend themselves in what is essentially a 'human rights world'. Or to ensure such social status is earned.
Non-discrimination on the ground of social origin is in the
United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, upon which our human rights laws are based.
The ramifications of this international and domestic discrimination on the grounds of social status are profound. For example, globalization is based on this discrimination. One of the major claims of those who promote globalization is that it has taken many millions out of poverty in China - but human rights protects minorities consequently you cannot destroy the lives (which must also be worth living) of New Zealand children even if it helps the children of the very poor in China. Human rights does not allow such an 'ends justifies the means', psychopathic approach. The beautiful idea of 'global citizenship' has turned into something ugly, a 'global elite citizenship' using a discriminatory human rights agenda.
While it is inevitable that such a 'born to rule' elite would see the British class system as their model, unlike Britain which is more honest about its faults and not so lacking in tolerance to exclude those with exceptional ability, our elite perpetuates the 'equality myth' :
Social values: New Zealanders have a very similar way of life and share values common to most Western countries, but there are some special features. We are passionate about sport, and have a firm belief in social equality. The social welfare system prevents extreme poverty, and the nation has neither a strong class system nor major social tensions. Differences between high and low-income people are not pronounced (17 Dec 2006).
Other support for my work has come from Rosslyn Noonan, New Zealand's Chief Human Rights Commissioner. Also an email from John Key's office on 27 May 2009 stated: "The Prime Minister will appreciate your taking the time to write to him".
The above discrimination and human rights omissions are 'easily' verified from human rights law and the internet can locate original UN sources and major international NGOs with consultative status with the UN.
I am confident that the above truth will help people, not only in New Zealand but around the world. Considering the emphasis New Zealand places on a good human rights image (we do not have economic or military might) it may consider including this ground of non-discrimination immediately and the State could immediately fund human rights education. Also needed to include in domestic law is Article 29 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which requires that 'everyone has duties to the community', to ensure that social status is earned. BACK TO FRONT PAGE
JOKERS WILD
15 September 2009
Being a bit of a joker does not make me an expert card player by any 'whist' of the imagination (besides, I don't have the patience) but I don't have to be an expert to understand that when
we play a game of cards with someone we deal fair and don't cheat...and on this basis...my heart goes out to the Berryman's whom have been dragged into a game of charades with some bottom-of-the-pack shufflers in the New Zealand Defence Force over a game called 'Bridge'
Now, according to Hoyle...the structure of 'Bridge' is supposed to be laid down according to the rules, but it would seem that some mavericks in the NZDF have not only been dealing from under the table but may also have been under the influence of a few too many 'gin rummy's' and have now brought the game into disrepute because it has collapsed...like a pack of cards! ...And if the NZDF thinks that playing the 'Justice Wild' card to take the 'trick' (the army engineers report on the bridge) so that it cannot be used to exonerate the Berryman's, then they are mistaken.
And what has the NZDF done so far to repair the damage? ...Instead of providing a 'jack'-up to fix the 'Bridge' the 'knave' NZDF 'jack'-up the enquiry and to show they are all 'Heart' the rough 'Diamond' running the Government offered 150,000 measly 'chips' for compensation that really basically says...'Go Fish' ...Anyone whom insults other people like that deserves being thumped on the head with a 'Club' and buried with a 'Spade'
Public outrage over the Berryman's unjust treatment has summoned lawyer Rob Moodie swinging the sword of truth to jump into the fray on a charger named justice for the common man. A noble deed to be sure and compares to the light brigade charging up the barrels of the big guns except in this case Balaclava is not the valley our brave knight is pounding down, but is what faceless bureaucrats must be wearing so the public cannot identify whom is responsible for not morally and rightfully compensating the Berryman's for their unlawful loss of freedoms, rights and liberties.
Blaming innocent citizens of our community for the collapse of a bridge that they did not build or own that was built on land they did not own (queens chain) that caused the death of one of our peers is not going to 'Bridge the gap' in public relations.
Here's a piece of advice for the card sharks in the NZDF ...Because you people are such lousy 'Bridge' players I suggest you try a new game that should stop you getting into trouble with monuments to your selves constructed in lofty places and will bring you down to a more appropriate level to reduce the chance of you doing any more damage to members of the public...
...This new game is called...'Pontoon'
Benny Bennetts
EROSION OF TRIAL BY JURY AND PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
2 February 2008 ,
by Gerard O'Brien
The old law of the land is called
lex terrae (or legem terrae) and is referred to as the common law. It contains no statute law and is the most ancient law, being the laws established from the customs of the people. King Alfred began his reign in 872. History tells us he recorded those laws and, as the Sovereign sworn to maintain them, was strict with his Judges.
He transmitted the name of one Judge Freburne to posterity. It was reported in Home's Mirror, pp 239-240, that "He hanged Freburne because he judged Harpin to die, whereas the jury were in doubt of their verdict, for in doubtful cases one ought rather to save than to condemn."
It is clear from this single example that the presumption of innocence, the right to trial-by-jury, and the requirement for a guilty verdict to be unanimous were principles embodied in lex terrae and pre-date the Great Charter.
The Great Charter of 1215, the Magna Carta, was exacted from King John, at the point of the sword so to speak, to reaffirm the principles of the common law and the sworn duty of the Sovereign to maintain them. Sovereigns that break their oath in this matter perjure themselves, and history shows those that have done so have been deposed (e.g. Richard II).
The fundamental principles of lex terrae are lights that shine in perpetuity. They do not dim or fade as time passes. The rights these principles assert are real, and very precious. The lives of many good men have been given in the course of maintaining these principles and rights over the centuries in the face of tyranny. It is these rights that were extended to Maori in the Treaty of Waitangi.
In 1368 King Edward III asserted that no law could contravene the principles of lex terrae that were reaffirmed in the Great Charter [(1368) 42 Edw 3, c 3.] In this Statute it is said "That the Great Charter and the Charter of the Forest be holden and kept in all Points; and if any Statute be made to the contrary that shall be holden for none."
This Imperial Statute [(1368) 42 Edw 3, c 3.] remains in force in New Zealand (see Schedule 1 of Imperial Laws Application Act 1988).
This Statute reaffirms the preeminence of the principles of the Great Charter and lex terrae. Its repeal could not extinguish that preeminence. It means that if Parliament makes a Statute that is repugnant to the principles reaffirmed by the Great Charter, that Statute is not law and is not enforceable. Parliament having penned such a Statute cannot assert it as law. Juries have a duty to reject that Statute as unlawful, Judges (as of their oath lest they perjure themselves) must reject that Statute as unlawful, and the Governor General may not grant Royal Assent to the Statute lest our Sovereign be perjured by proxy.
The New Zealand Parliament has been considering the Criminal Procedure Bill which has provisions to introduce majority 11:1 guilty verdict requirements, and provisions to introduce trial-by-judge under certain circumstances. Such provisions as detailed in the bill are contrary to the principles of the Great Charter and lex terrae. It is unlawful law and may not be enacted.
Section 92A of the Copyright (New Technologies) Amendment Act 2008, with its provision for guilt by accusation, is contrary to the lex terrae principle of "Presumption of Innocence" and is contrary to the Great Charter by attempting to deny an accused a right to trial-by-jury. It is unlawful law and "shall be holden for none" [(1368) 42 Edw 3, c 3.].
It is unfortunate but true that there is another existing Statute that also contains provisions that contravene the Great Charter and lex terrae. I was made aware that Sections 19A and 19B of the Judicature Act 1908 make provisions for jury trials to be dispensed with in certain cases. It is unlawful law and "shall be holden for none" [(1368) 42 Edw 3, c 3.].
I doubt any of the Legislatures or our country has ever intended to place our Sovereign in a position at odds with the laws of the land she is sworn to maintain. Yet that is where we find ourselves today.
The principle of presumption of innocence, the principle of the right to trial by jury and the principle of unanimity in guilty verdicts cannot be trifled with. Fundamental principles of the law of the land and the rights they assert cannot be contravened by any legal law. The principles are the foundation of the law. The issue is neither negotiable nor arguable.
That this be true is attested by history. Contravention or evasion of these great fundamental principles by Sovereigns brought disorder and revolution and at the cost of blood and life the people restored their ancient rights. I pray we do not have to walk those paths again.
It would be impossible to describe the enactment and enforcement of laws that contravene these great fundamental principles, with the coercive force of the state, as anything other than tyranny or despotism.
Expediency in procedure seems to arise as the basis for making laws that contravene fundamental principles of law and justice, and not just in New Zealand. Australian Hansard records of May 2006 show that in the second reading of their Jury Amendments (Verdicts) Bill, Reverend The Honourable Dr Gordon Moyes says that 'The High Court in Cheatle v The Queen, in 1993 volume 177 of Commonwealth Law Reports at page 560, held that "to abrogate the requirement of unanimity involves an abandonment of an essential feature of the institution of trial by jury". Further, the court was not convinced that considerations of convenience favoured the abolition of unanimity.'
How refreshing, a contemporary reaffirmation of the principle of unanimity. Also important here is the identification of the notion of convenience being used as a tool to undermine fundamental principles. It disgusts me that some seek expediency in order that the prosecution may more readily gain a conviction. Attempting to dictate how a case be tried depending on the proposed punishment is equally abhorrent and pernicious.
To declare to an accused man that his inalienable right to trial-by-jury does not exist because the charges made, if proven, do not entail a sentence of imprisonment, or imprisonment for this or that many months or years, is an abomination.
Not only does it discard the principle of the right to trial-by-jury, it also perniciously discards the principle of presumption of innocence, and replaces it with presumption of guilt, on the basis that there are facts already determined by the prosecution! Shame on all who would propose such despicable measures. The facts may only be determined by a legally constituted jury and the law is not decided until the jury delivers its verdict.
What did our forefathers hold to be the truth in these matters? I quote from a letter to the editor of Flower's Political Review and Monthly Register Volume VIII, July-January 1810-1811, p 268-269. The particulars quoted are concerning the curse laid on those who would infringe the Great Charter.
'Lord Somers has given us the following particulars: "King Henry III, attended with all the great nobility of England, all the bishops, and chief prelates, in their ornaments, with burning candles in their hands, assembled to hear the terrible sentence of excommunication upon all the infringers of the Great Charter, which was thus pronounced : In the name of the Omnipotent God &c; which done the Charter of King John his father was read; in the end having thrown away their candles they cried out - So let them who incur this sentence be extinct, and stink in hell: and the King with a loud voice said - As God help me, I will as a man, a christian, a knight, a king crowned and anointed, inviolably observe all these things." Lord Somers has not here recited the curse, but the reader will find it at large in British Liberties or Freeborn Subjects Inheritance, p 50 and 52. It extended to "all those that in any point do resist, or break, or in any manner hereafter procure, counsel, or any ways assent to resist, or break, those ordinances, or go about it by word or deed, openly or privily, by any manner of pretence or colour &c." Whence we plainly see that Magna Charta was not to be infringed under colour of privilege, or any other pretence; - they particularly applied the curse to legislators, judges, and other constituted authorities, as follows. "And all that secretly or openly, by deed, word, or council, do make statutes, or observe them being made, and that bring in customs, or keep them when they be brought in against ths [sic] said liberties, or any of them, the writers, the law-makers, the counselors, and the executioners of them, and all those that shall presume to judge against them."'
.....and.....
'Here we see clearly that all who make statutes - that is King, Lords and Commons, for who else have ever made any statutes in this country, do willfully consign themselves to eternal perdition, if they shall at any time thereafter make any statutes, or bring in any customs into parliament, contrary to any of the said liberties.'
In closing, I offer that all good and reasonable men and women would rightly expect that our sworn representatives make things aright and survey their Statutes expunging all legislation that contravenes the fundamental principles in lex terrae and reaffirmed in the Great Charter, the Magna Carta.
Bond and Corruption
24 December 2008
New Zealand is by its own population perceived as country with little or no corruption. This self assessment does not hold water, especially when you observe the country from outside its boundaries.
Most perceive corruption as events where shady judges or jury members meet delinquent lawyers, business people or accused criminals in dark corners of back street bars and wads of untraceable cash change hands to secure a favourable predictable outcome, or business people put journalists and news bosses on their own payroll to secure favourable media coverage "Goodfather style".
It is highly unlikely that such events take place in New Zealand, but Kiwis have with their ingenuity developed another more sophisticated corruption. The very word "corruption" is Latin and literally means that many cooperate (co-) to break (rupture) the system for their own gain, financial or other.
That is the New Zealand corruption, a quite, unspoken, well understood collusion between individuals and groups of individuals. Let's call it "bonds-corruption". They take advantage of the invisible personal bonds between like-thinking individuals, professionals and groups for financial and other gain as social standing or noble dishonesty where no personal gain is intended.
We all well know that if you don't pay a lawyer to represent you in any court, you are immediately put under intense pressure by judges, who also are lawyers, and court staff to pay a lawyer, and if you do not comply, the judge and the court staff will almost invariably short-change you. The fraternity of legal people protect their own standing in the society and their financial gains using like thinking professional bonds.
Judges do not lie, or do they? Well - secret, but unlawful, recordings of cases we have received tell a different story. People who used small MP3 devices and recorded proceedings have compared the recording to the written transcript, and found it is different. At the same time the official court audio recording has "disappeared", "accidentally been recorded over", "not saved for extensive times", or the court staff simply does not bother to respond. At the same time, the person who recorded the session dare not come forward as that would trigger a harsh retaliation from the judges.
Europe abolished their secret courts after the NAZI era, but New Zealand has maintained one secret court, the Family Court. The Family Court website claim that Judges are appointed based on special qualifications suitable for the task, but the reality seems to be that judges that do not stand up to public scrutiny have chosen to selectively apply to work for just this court as they do not have to endure the media scrutiny. The court is secret.
Other methods to protect the bonds-corruption are frequently used suppression orders from judges, and legal intimidation from lawyers. This together with the unusually strict and odd New Zealand defamation laws form a near water tight system used to protect white collar criminals, shady business people and their dealings, and bonds-corrupt lawyers and judges.
Lawyers in New Zealand also have a monopolistic and exclusive access to courts and justice, nobody else can file for proceedings, and only lawyers can represent others. Why does this exclusive closed club of individuals have such privileged rights no other professions have. Probably because the make the rules themselves. It is equivalent to AA having sole right to make traffic laws, REINZ to make property laws, and the
Society
of
Accountants would have the sole right to make company law, and then these institutions could then exercise some form of taxation as compulsory use of their services. This is what the legal fraternity has done.
The legal fraternity also have their own disciplinary system, lawyers judge lawyers. New Zealand needs a system where the public are able to make that judgment. The media that was supposed to perform that function has effectively bee silenced.
The free media with free speech is supposed to keep a tab on corrupt and bonds-corrupt courts, businesspeople politicians and alleged criminals, but with laws as the defamation laws, the frequent suppression orders, legal intimidation and media bosses selective over time breeding of a tame journalist class that will not cause trouble, that safety guard has been put out of action. A free and independent media and free speech has said to be one of the foundations for democracy, but not so in New Zealand.
There is nothing in New Zealand that protects free speech or anonymity of media and internet sources, as the constitution does in most civilized countries. That authorities as the police and other public services are routinely systematic collecting information on all individuals and their activities is in reality an effective and functional censorship. The latest collection of information by the police SIG teams of unions and activists just show what is really going on behind closed doors. Nobody with a coupe of kids in school, a mortgage, and a regular income would even contemplate to stand up against the bonds-corrupt establishment.
They could not survive an attack from white collar criminals, businesses or business people, or the legal fraternity as lawyers and judges. With a regular income and assets, they can not access legal aid, and not risk family and personal ruin, so they have to remain silenced and pacified.
The very system once intended to protect them is being used to suppress and control them for others financial benefit.
The solutions are not one singular but many, an internet based media placed outside New Zealand jurisdiction and administrated by people that can not be reached and intimidated by the New Zealand legal fraternity, business community, or criminals. A strict protection of media sources against investigation and data collection would be neded.
A changed court system and legal system that give any individual access to the courts and any individual the right to represent others. A system where judges or lawyers can be monitored and removed by the public, rather than secret and convoluted systems as presently. All court cases to be video recorded and the recording made available over the internet indefinitely.
New Zealand has to change laws and legal systems to remove the focus of justice from law as a science and history only a few can understand, to a system based on common sense and something every person can understand. The present laws and systems are so convoluted that it takes lengthy academic studies and a near life time experience to understand them, so how can the common man then be expected to abide by the law, a system of scattered legal fragment collected over some 170 years, and based on a country with a different culture on the other side of the globe.
Any skilled insider in that system can make just about anything from it. People overseas marvel that 150 year old laws about cattle straying onto a neighbours land can be applied to computer science. One Chinese lawyer asked how much grass the computer had to eat to entitle the land owner to compensation, and then laughed.
A removal of laws as the defamation laws, restriction of judge's right to suppress information, especially about other members of the legal elite, and a requirement that media must be independent and not owned or controlled by those it is to scrutinize. A complete overhaul of the rules to enable and implement system to expose and remedy bonds-corruption.
Why can judges now precede and rule over cases involving their own relatives or other associates. A reform is urgently needed, and can not be entrusted to the legal fraternity who would only use it to featherbed themselves further into bonds-corruption.
Changes need to be done by the public.
This has a profound effect on New Zealand's standing in world trade competition, and it certainly show up in the trade balance figures. Few foreign business people would even contemplate coming to such an incestuous place to do business, let alone the racial and discriminatory barriers the state has created in the visa and access system to prevent them. Chinese people often tell me they don't dare to go to New Zealand for business or study as they fear being attacked on the streets.
Rick Harriss ,
Kiwi writer in Hong Kong
Dear Dr Collins
I wonder if you can help me. I am not a lawyer and I'm struggling to get my head around some legal issues that I have seen in the newspapers recently (particularly the Sunday Star Times and Farmers' Weekly). My understanding is that you are NZ's most senior lawyer, so I'm sure you'll be able to explain just how things work.
First, this business of Justice Bill Wilson hearing a case in the Court of Appeal where the lawyer acting for one of the parties was his best friend and business partner in a multi-million dollar horse stud. Seems totally inappropriate to me. I know that I wouldn't like to go to court and find out later that the judge was the best friend and business partner of the lawyer for the other side. I think I'd be pretty upset, because it is unreasonable to presume the judge would give the party opposing his best mate a fair hearing. Well, maybe he could, but I'd be very dubious and it would be rather nice to see that justice was being done. What I do know is that, in a situation like this, the judge is required to stand aside from hearing the case. Still, in a search on the internet, I can't find any punishment for NZ judges who ignore this requirement.
So, you will appreciate that, to a lay person such as myself, this seems like a clear-cut case of judicial bias. But I'm sure you'll be able to correct my misunderstanding.
Okay, the second bit I'm struggling with is this. Justice Wilson sat through the hearing and helped overturn the High Court decision which was based on the hearing of evidence. Months later, the guy who had won in the High Court and lost in the Court of Appeal (Peter Radford) found out about the judge's conflict and was pretty upset. And rightly so, I believe. He went to Professor Duncan Webb at the University of Canterbury Law School who is an expert on legal ethics. Prof Webb wrote to the Judicial Conduct Commissioner (JCC) asking him to investigate the situation, but the JCC claimed that he does not have jurisdiction. Whoa, hang on, stop right there. Let me get this clear. The one person in NZ specifically given jurisdiction to investigate judicial misconduct claims he has no jurisdiction to investigate judicial misconduct. Do you see my problem here?
Now, being a curious person, I found out all I could about the JCC on the internet and I'd have to say it is a position which abounds in coincidences. First, the man who acts as the JCC (Ian Haynes) also works for a big law firm in Auckland, which I find a rather odd coincidence, as I'd always assumed that the JCC would work for the public of NZ given that we pay his salary. But it now seems that he works for the lawyers and the judges. Second, in the three years of the existence of the JCC, he has received over 300 complaints about judges, but not one has been deemed worthy of further investigation. Not one. Extraordinary coincidence.
Anyway, back to Peter Radford. As I understand it, the JCC finally agreed that he may have jurisdiction to investigate the complaint, so he wrote a very polite (I'm sure) letter to Justice Wilson asking him to explain. But before Justice Wilson could respond, he first had to see the file on the case. Why he needed to read the case file in order to remember whether he had a conflict or not is beyond me, but as I keep saying, I'm not a lawyer and I don't understand these things. But now, in another extraordinary coincidence, the court has lost the case file. Now I'm really curious. Can you tell me how the court can lose a very large file in a very small building? Don't they have a filing system? Not even a stack of boxes in the corner?
Anyway, before the Court of Appeal hearing Justice Wilson revealed to Radford's QC that he owned some horses together with the opposing lawyer. In other words, by partially disclosing his conflict to the QC, he actually confirmed that he knew that he had a conflict. Can it be true that he then decided to hear the case anyway, apparently ignoring all of the advice given to judges about how to deport themselves in this sort of situation? So now the JCC looked to be in a bit of a tight spot. He has been told by the legal ethics expert that he (the JCC) did indeed have jurisdiction over this form of judicial conduct and the judge himself had confirmed that there was a conflict. Now this is getting really tricky for someone who is 0 from 300, but boy did he ever get lucky! By the most amazing of coincidences, he was suddenly called overseas for six weeks. Wow, now that really is lucky! Fancy being urgently called overseas for six weeks just as he was on the verge of addressing the most important constitutional crisis he has yet to encounter in his career.
Come on, Dr Collins, if this weren't so serious it would be absolutely hilarious! The JCC must surely be an embarrassment to all right-thinking judges, don't you think? What on earth are the public going to think when this extraordinary smoke-and-mirrors behaviour is exposed?
But back to the main story. It then started to get a bit complicated, because other things were happening at the same time as Mr Radford was waiting for the JCC to decide for the 301st time that he couldn't possibly find any basis to investigate an allegation of judicial misconduct. To cut a long story short, it seems Mr Radford instructed his lawyer to appeal to the Supreme Court to overturn the Court of Appeal decision because of Justice Wilson's apparent conflict of interest.
Now, this is where you can help me directly because, if I'm reading the newspaper articles right, you have known about the Justice Wilson situation since at least May, but you have done nothing. Your website confirms that, along with the Attorney General, you are the ultimate protector of the public interest and the ultimate maintainer of the rule of law in NZ. I would have thought that the best course of action would have been for you to recommend that the Court of Appeal decision be set aside, confess that the Crown had made a stuff-up, censure Justice Wilson, compensate the parties involved and life would have gone on.
But no, Mr Radford has been forced to go to the Supreme Court to appeal for some justice. Now, let's just stop and think about that for a second. Mr Radford appears to have been the victim of a procedural injustice in the Court of Appeal. The Crown is at fault. It is therefore the Crown's responsibility to correct the situation. But Mr Radford, who presumably has spent huge sums of money just getting to the Court of Appeal, is forced to spend yet more money going to the Supreme Court to correct the fault of the Crown. It seems awfully like blaming the victim to me. Can you please explain to me how you, as Solicitor General, have acted in the public interest or acted to maintain the rule of law in this situation?
And now we come to the really tricky bit. As I understand it, Mr Radford's lawyer also worked for the Department of Conservation, but has now been sacked because she has brought the case to the Supreme Court. As you know, I am not a lawyer and obviously I am ignorant of the niceties of the law, but to me your actions look very much like an attempt to influence the outcome of a court case. I would be extremely grateful if you would explain to me how this is different from perverting the course of justice.
Oh, and one last thing. A hypothetical question. What would happen if a judge having what appears to the reasonable lay person to be clear conflict of interest were to be cleared of any wrongdoing? Do you think anyone in NZ would ever have faith in the judiciary again?
James Jenkins
Auckland
DO NEW ZEALAND COURTS PUT CONTEMPT ABOVE THE RULE OF LAW?
20 June 2008
Article by Anne Hunt
Theoretically the Courts have an obligation to respect this right, although there are some legitimate limitations to protect citizens from defamation, a breach of privacy and offensive material. And then there are the constraints attributable to court orders, many of them imposed to protect the right of a person to a fair hearing. But therein, lies the rub.
Courts, when imposing court orders, surely have a responsibility to ensure there is justification for imposing court orders, rather than do so purely to censor information somebody wants
suppressed. The discretion of the Courts to suppress information by way of court orders then becomes a serious threat to the well-established legal right to impart information and opinions. Breach of a court order is considered a contempt of court - a serious offence for which the penalties include imprisonment for an indeterminate period of time.
In recent years, the following have faced, or are due to face contempt of court proceedings:
* an MP - Dr Nick Smith for disclosing information on radio relating to a Family Court matter. Conviction could have cost him his political career.
* a lawyer - Bob Moodie for disclosing the Butcher report in the Berryman case. Conviction deprived him of his right to practice for a period of time.
* a newspaper editor - Tim Pankhurst for coverage in the Dominion Post of the police terrorism raids
* an author - Anne Hunt for her coverage of the outcome of a sexual abuse case. Conviction could have cost her, her seat on the Horowhenua District Council.
* and of course a businessman - Vince Seimer for disclosing information on a web-site which is subject to an interim injunction in a defamation suit - yet to be heard.
In his New Zealand Civil Rights handbook, Tim McBride says that contempt of court is a potentially dangerous constraint on freedom of expression because it involves criminal proceedings that are unaccompanied by the ordinary safeguards of the criminal law. Court orders can, in effect, sanction secret trials - the very antithesis of the transparency necessary to not only ensure that justice is done, but also seen to be done.
Not possible for secret trials to occur in a democratic country, you may presume. Court documents prove otherwise. Court orders in New Zealand can be potent enough to suppress the very existence of the proceedings, and that is the point at which, the right of the Courts to impose court orders must be curbed. A person who appears in a courtroom which is closed to the public, has lost all rights to a fair and open hearing and is totally at the mercy of the Judge. And Courts which exercise that right, should quite rightly be held in contempt!
The classic case which demonstrates how dangerous court orders is my own: A v A Hunt CIV-2003-485-2553. (Ironically, my name appeared on all court documents and was displayed outside the High Court in full view of the public, despite the name suppression order in force.) On Friday 21 November 2003, Justice John Wild issued ex parte orders suppressing the existence of the proceedings. These orders were not intended to be an interim measure. Hugh Rennie QC had sought these orders to allow his client, the plaintiff, his day in court.
In other words, I as the defendant was denied the right to tell my husband that I would be travelling from my Foxton Beach home to Wellington because I had been summoned to appear in the Wellington High Court charged with contempt of court. It would have been contempt of court for me to do so.
The Court had also deprived me of my right to access the documents used for my research and which had been returned to the owner. For this reason I was not in a position to challenge allegations - and at this stage they were only allegations - that I had breached a court order, and therefore had no option but to recall all copies of my book at that stage on sale in bookshops. Library copies were also returned to await the outcome of the civil claim for contempt of court. The onus was now upon the plaintiff to prove the contempt of court, but in the meantime the book had effectively been banned. After two hearings in closed Chambers, I came to the conclusion that I had no hope of a fair hearing unless I succeeded in getting the order suppressing the existence of the proceedings uplifted.
After nine months, Justice Forest Miller - the fourth judge I had encountered - conceded this order was extraordinary and removed it. Nevertheless all ten interlocutory hearings continued be heard in closed chambers, and all documents remained confidential to the parties. Justice Ron Young presided over the remaining interlocutory hearings; hearings which lacked transparency, and hence fairness.
After a three-day hearing before Justice Wild in Wellington, I was found to be in contempt of court, fined and ordered to pay damages, court costs and disbursements to the plaintiff.
Justice Wild issued instructions for all copies of my book to be destroyed, and the order suppressing the title of my book was to remain in place. This meant that, in effect, anybody could be charged with contempt of court, merely for mentioning the title of the book. Such is the impact of court orders!
A stay of execution was required to prevent the destruction of my books, as I had filed an appeal on the grounds that Justice Wild had set aside all evidence relating to Dr David Collins QC (now the Solicitor-General) because I chose not to call him as a witness.
The Court of Appeal quashed all High Court orders, after reaching the view that Justice Wild had 'inadvertently' erred in his interpretation of the hearsay rule. Only now can I disclose the documents which confirm that I had indeed been confronted with the prospect of a secret trial to ban Broken Silence, pressure which took a significant toll on my own health and that of my husband. He suffered a fatal heart attack and died four months after urging me to settle because he had said he could not bear to live without me. A few days later, he apologised, stating that the principles we were fighting for were too important to be sacrificed. Tragically we had sensed that this litigation would ultimately be the death of one of us.
Although the Court of Appeal has now exonerated me, I now have nothing but contempt for court.
As the author of The Foxton Murder, and having covered the murder trial following the death of Dr Howard Teppett and rape of his sister, I had always encouraged people to respect the integrity of the Courts. Only now, having experienced first-hand the intimidation that occurs in courtrooms without the safeguard of transparency, I have come to the belief that the Courts are no longer worthy of my respect. Indeed I cannot rest whilst other law-abiding citizens are treated with contempt by the very Courts which have an obligation to respect the right to seek, receive and impart information and opinions of any kind in any form.
As I understand it, Michael Stiassny has yet to prove that the information subject to an interim injunction is defamatory, and until he has done so, the Solicitor-General must be cautious about resorting to contempt of court proceedings.
The Court of Appeal conceded that Dr David Collins QC undoubtedly made quite extensive notations on my manuscript, and that these notations confirm that he had viewed the page relevant to my own contempt of court proceedings. Amongst other documents disclosed as evidence was the note I had taken of his phone call to me on Monday 18 June 2001, and which confirms that, disclosed to me during the course of this conversation was information subject to a suppression order.
It is not generally known that my books were recalled twice. On the first occasion it was to delete a surname covered by a name suppression order. As this surname had appeared on every document relating to this case I had seen (and I had viewed a considerable number of Court of Appeal documents referring to this associated case), I was appalled to discover that the Court of Appeal had 'inadvertently' released this name and yet I could still be charged with contempt if I did not agree to recall my books at considerable expense and delete this name from every book.
If disclosures by the Courts and also the lawyer who is now the Solicitor-General can inadvertently place members of the public in contempt of court, then the Courts themselves need to review their own procedures to ensure that all those associated with the legal profession meet the same standards demanded of citizens who are not as conversant with the law as they are.
Until they do so, the Courts warrant my contempt for their double standards and complete disregard for the Bill of Rights, they are required by law to uphold.
Contempt of court is, as I can now confirm, a potentially dangerous constraint on freedom of expression and the time has come to curb the autocratic power Judges wield when issuing court orders.
Judges have already proved that they are prepared to sanction secret trials for no other reason than to allow the plaintiff his day in court. When Judges are also prepared to issue court orders to censor information which embarrasses influential people or organisations, the Courts have deprived law-abiding citizens of the very rights the Bill of Rights was enacted to uphold. The precedents are in place, and warrant our contempt. BACK TO FRONT PAGE
FEDERATED FARMERS SOUND-OFF ON RATES INCREASES
10 June 2008
It is that time of year when councils plan their rate increases. Not exactly a popular topic, but one that gets much attention from Federated Farmers.
Most folk run a mile from the two-inch thick annual and long term plans that set out council's spending and rating intentions for the coming year, but not Federated Farmers. Those plans are the basis of members rates invoice, and too many farmers are now paying rates in excess of $10,000 a year.
Escalating rates bills will be a blow for a great many farmers under financial stress from the high dollar, increasing farm expenses, and the summer dry. The last ten years has seen huge growth in local government activity and expenditure, with staggering rates increases for many farmers. The extent to which the cost of rates is affecting primary industry is reflected in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry's monitor farms - where rates are often in the top six farm working expenses. Anyone trying to make a living from farming knows how it stacks up.
The real concern is that our modern local government is empowered to do pretty much anything, but is restricted to a narrow, medieval funding base made up of property value rates and property charges. Confusing at best, rates prevent communities from assessing the costs and benefits of council activities. For farmers it means a particularly heavy tax on their most significant asset - land - to pay for all manner of community services, many of which farmers rarely if ever use.
The Federation is once again gearing up its rates efforts. At a local level it will be submitting on over 60 draft annual plans from the far north to the deep south, working within the rules of the game to achieve fairer rating systems and lower rates. A Rates Guide and a standard submission template have also been prepared to help individual members with their own submissions. To access these tools members can contact 0800 327 646.
Although our local work is invaluable and achieves a number of 'wins', the real change we all want is only going to be possible by changing the rules of the game.
At a national level the Federation is continuing to keep the heat on the government to change these rules. This involves behind the scenes lobbying to influence the government's consideration of last year's Rates Inquiry report. Federated Farmers is meeting with politicians of all persuasion and publicly highlighting the inequities of property value-based rates.
Rates Inquiry - What Feds Want
Federated Farmers wants councils to:
* Move away from fully-funding depreciation and take better account of inter-generational equity through prudent use of debt
* Make greater use of targeted rates to ensure that there is a better link between the funding of services and a resident's access to and benefit from such services.
* Provide ratepayers with itemised rates assessments, report financial information consistently to enable comparisons, and participate in performance benchmarking
Federated Farmers wants central government to:
* Provide more revenue from petrol taxes and road user charges to ensure that local roads (like state highways) are funded according to road use rather than property value.
* Commit funds to councils if it is imposing increased roles, responsibilities and costs on councils.
* Commit one cent of the 12.5 cents of GST as a general revenue share for local government.
* Remove all rating exemptions on land, including Department of Conservation land.
* Make it clear that central government retains all responsibility for income redistribution and that this is not a role for councils. RETURN TO FRONT PAGE
A Clayton's Commissioner?
The office of the Judicial Conduct Commissioner was created in 2004 - supposedly to enable the public to seek redress regarding inappropriate conduct of judges. I say supposedly, because of 106 complaints, in the 2005-2006 year alone, none warranted a recommendation to the Attorney-General to appoint a Judicial Conduct Panel for review. Although six were referred to the head of the bench for further consideration the way this office is structured means that the Commissioner is the sole gatekeeper to any complaint - there is no alternative avenue of redress at the initial stage, such as a lay observer, if the Commissioner declines to take further action. Given this lack of accountability cynics could argue that it would be all too easy to use a few token referrals for cosmetic purposes, thus masking rejected complaints of substance. The current commissioner is a one Mr. Haynes, whose curriculum vitae includes a stint as president of the Auckland District Law Society - hardly a ringing endorsement one would have thought considering the reputation law societies have in this country of bending over backwards to protect their own members; the Auckland District Law Society being the recipient of scathing criticism from the Privy Council no less.
So how does this office stack up in practice? Is it a genuine attempt to call judges to account for inappropriate behavior, or is it more like what Louise Nicolas experienced when she initially tried to lay a complaint - all too incestuous for comfort? Consider the following: -
In March 2000 I was unfortunate enough to be in the defendant in a civil action for breach of contract. The hearing was before Mr. Justice Gittos. A key witness-a warehouse manager-testified that counsel for the plaintiff had approached him with an affidavit to sign. This blatantly biased document claimed I converted my business partner's goods, which at the time were stored in this witness's warehouse. The plaintiff was in arrears by several thousand dollars in storage fees and it was implied by plaintiff's counsel (according to the manager) that if he cooperated then it would make a difference to this outstanding debt being settled. This damming revelation (in response to a direct question from defense counsel) was followed by a deafening silence. Yet no denial was ever issued by plaintiff's counsel- just a cry 'Your honor!' It can't be every day in court that one counsel is prepared to cast such a slur on their opposite number, so it makes even more remarkable that Justice Gittos chose to remain silent when it must have occurred to him that there might well be some substance to this allegation. The affidavit in question was undoubtedly genuine since it bore the legal firm's letterhead. Further, the affidavit appeared to have been drawn up ad hoc without prior consultation, then thrown down in front of the warehouse manager for signing -which raises the question what on earth gave plaintiff's counsel a reason to think the manager would cooperate with such a crass approach?
Under the statute that it operates, the Office of the Judicial Conduct Commissioner is obliged to refer complaints to the judge concerned for comment, unless considered frivolous; apparently my complaint was deemed worthy, albeit begrudgingly.
The response from Justice Gittos was astounding. He claimed that since both the plaintiff and the defendant were in dispute with the warehouse manager over unpaid invoices he felt constrained from perusing this matter further. To which I pointed out to the Commissioner that the warehouse manager himself had testified that there never had been any dispute with the defendant over unpaid invoices, and no evidence was ever given to the contrary. Rather than apologize the judge now attempted to defend the indefensible by claiming that since I was denied access to the manager's warehouse this amounted to the same thing! He went further and suggested I should have gone instead to the Law Society or Police on such a matter - re his conduct or plaintiff's counsel, I'm not quite sure. And Commissioner Haynes response? - he was only too happy to endorse Justice Gittos' stance of speak no evil against one's fellow brethren.
'Does this mean,' I asked the commissioner, 'if he himself was denied access to his office because his employer was in dispute with the landlord over unpaid rent, it was acceptable for me to write to other parties claiming the landlord was in dispute with Mr. Haynes over unpaid invoices ? And wouldn't such actions be considered libelous? '
My concerns were dismissed as irrelevant and frivolous.
Who judges the judges might be an age-old question, but one thing is for certain that person shouldn't be a member of the New Zealand legal profession.
Geoff Beach
Kohi, Auckland
So how does this office stack up in practice? Is it a genuine attempt to call judges to account for inappropriate behavior, or is it more like what Louise Nicolas experienced when she initially tried to lay a complaint - all too incestuous for comfort? Consider the following: -
In March 2000 I was unfortunate enough to be in the defendant in a civil action for breach of contract. The hearing was before Mr. Justice Gittos. A key witness-a warehouse manager-testified that counsel for the plaintiff had approached him with an affidavit to sign. This blatantly biased document claimed I converted my business partner's goods, which at the time were stored in this witness's warehouse. The plaintiff was in arrears by several thousand dollars in storage fees and it was implied by plaintiff's counsel (according to the manager) that if he cooperated then it would make a difference to this outstanding debt being settled. This damming revelation (in response to a direct question from defense counsel) was followed by a deafening silence. Yet no denial was ever issued by plaintiff's counsel- just a cry 'Your honor!' It can't be every day in court that one counsel is prepared to cast such a slur on their opposite number, so it makes even more remarkable that Justice Gittos chose to remain silent when it must have occurred to him that there might well be some substance to this allegation. The affidavit in question was undoubtedly genuine since it bore the legal firm's letterhead. Further, the affidavit appeared to have been drawn up ad hoc without prior consultation, then thrown down in front of the warehouse manager for signing -which raises the question what on earth gave plaintiff's counsel a reason to think the manager would cooperate with such a crass approach?
Under the statute that it operates, the Office of the Judicial Conduct Commissioner is obliged to refer complaints to the judge concerned for comment, unless considered frivolous; apparently my complaint was deemed worthy, albeit begrudgingly.
The response from Justice Gittos was astounding. He claimed that since both the plaintiff and the defendant were in dispute with the warehouse manager over unpaid invoices he felt constrained from perusing this matter further. To which I pointed out to the Commissioner that the warehouse manager himself had testified that there never had been any dispute with the defendant over unpaid invoices, and no evidence was ever given to the contrary. Rather than apologize the judge now attempted to defend the indefensible by claiming that since I was denied access to the manager's warehouse this amounted to the same thing! He went further and suggested I should have gone instead to the Law Society or Police on such a matter - re his conduct or plaintiff's counsel, I'm not quite sure. And Commissioner Haynes response? - he was only too happy to endorse Justice Gittos' stance of speak no evil against one's fellow brethren.
'Does this mean,' I asked the commissioner, 'if he himself was denied access to his office because his employer was in dispute with the landlord over unpaid rent, it was acceptable for me to write to other parties claiming the landlord was in dispute with Mr. Haynes over unpaid invoices ? And wouldn't such actions be considered libelous? '
My concerns were dismissed as irrelevant and frivolous.
Who judges the judges might be an age-old question, but one thing is for certain that person shouldn't be a member of the New Zealand legal profession.
Geoff Beach
Kohi, Auckland
So how does this office stack up in practice? Is it a genuine attempt to call judges to account for inappropriate behavior, or is it more like what Louise Nicolas experienced when she initially tried to lay a complaint - all too incestuous for comfort? Consider the following: -
In March 2000 I was unfortunate enough to be in the defendant in a civil action for breach of contract. The hearing was before Mr. Justice Gittos. A key witness-a warehouse manager-testified that counsel for the plaintiff had approached him with an affidavit to sign. This blatantly biased document claimed I converted my business partner's goods, which at the time were stored in this witness's warehouse. The plaintiff was in arrears by several thousand dollars in storage fees and it was implied by plaintiff's counsel (according to the manager) that if he cooperated then it would make a difference to this outstanding debt being settled. This damming revelation (in response to a direct question from defense counsel) was followed by a deafening silence. Yet no denial was ever issued by plaintiff's counsel- just a cry 'Your honor!' It can't be every day in court that one counsel is prepared to cast such a slur on their opposite number, so it makes even more remarkable that Justice Gittos chose to remain silent when it must have occurred to him that there might well be some substance to this allegation. The affidavit in question was undoubtedly genuine since it bore the legal firm's letterhead. Further, the affidavit appeared to have been drawn up ad hoc without prior consultation, then thrown down in front of the warehouse manager for signing -which raises the question what on earth gave plaintiff's counsel a reason to think the manager would cooperate with such a crass approach?
Under the statute that it operates, the Office of the Judicial Conduct Commissioner is obliged to refer complaints to the judge concerned for comment, unless considered frivolous; apparently my complaint was deemed worthy, albeit begrudgingly.
The response from Justice Gittos was astounding. He claimed that since both the plaintiff and the defendant were in dispute with the warehouse manager over unpaid invoices he felt constrained from perusing this matter further. To which I pointed out to the Commissioner that the warehouse manager himself had testified that there never had been any dispute with the defendant over unpaid invoices, and no evidence was ever given to the contrary. Rather than apologize the judge now attempted to defend the indefensible by claiming that since I was denied access to the manager's warehouse this amounted to the same thing! He went further and suggested I should have gone instead to the Law Society or Police on such a matter - re his conduct or plaintiff's counsel, I'm not quite sure. And Commissioner Haynes response? - he was only too happy to endorse Justice Gittos' stance of speak no evil against one's fellow brethren.
'Does this mean,' I asked the commissioner, 'if he himself was denied access to his office because his employer was in dispute with the landlord over unpaid rent, it was acceptable for me to write to other parties claiming the landlord was in dispute with Mr. Haynes over unpaid invoices ? And wouldn't such actions be considered libelous? '
My concerns were dismissed as irrelevant and frivolous.
Who judges the judges might be an age-old question, but one thing is for certain that person shouldn't be a member of the New Zealand legal profession.
Geoff Beach
Kohi, Auckland
So how does this office stack up in practice? Is it a genuine attempt to call judges to account for inappropriate behavior, or is it more like what Louise Nicolas experienced when she initially tried to lay a complaint - all too incestuous for comfort? Consider the following: -
In March 2000 I was unfortunate enough to be in the defendant in a civil action for breach of contract. The hearing was before Mr. Justice Gittos. A key witness-a warehouse manager-testified that counsel for the plaintiff had approached him with an affidavit to sign. This blatantly biased document claimed I converted my business partner's goods, which at the time were stored in this witness's warehouse. The plaintiff was in arrears by several thousand dollars in storage fees and it was implied by plaintiff's counsel (according to the manager) that if he cooperated then it would make a difference to this outstanding debt being settled. This damming revelation (in response to a direct question from defense counsel) was followed by a deafening silence. Yet no denial was ever issued by plaintiff's counsel- just a cry 'Your honor!' It can't be every day in court that one counsel is prepared to cast such a slur on their opposite number, so it makes even more remarkable that Justice Gittos chose to remain silent when it must have occurred to him that there might well be some substance to this allegation. The affidavit in question was undoubtedly genuine since it bore the legal firm's letterhead. Further, the affidavit appeared to have been drawn up ad hoc without prior consultation, then thrown down in front of the warehouse manager for signing -which raises the question what on earth gave plaintiff's counsel a reason to think the manager would cooperate with such a crass approach?
Under the statute that it operates, the Office of the Judicial Conduct Commissioner is obliged to refer complaints to the judge concerned for comment, unless considered frivolous; apparently my complaint was deemed worthy, albeit begrudgingly.
The response from Justice Gittos was astounding. He claimed that since both the plaintiff and the defendant were in dispute with the warehouse manager over unpaid invoices he felt constrained from perusing this matter further. To which I pointed out to the Commissioner that the warehouse manager himself had testified that there never had been any dispute with the defendant over unpaid invoices, and no evidence was ever given to the contrary. Rather than apologize the judge now attempted to defend the indefensible by claiming that since I was denied access to the manager's warehouse this amounted to the same thing! He went further and suggested I should have gone instead to the Law Society or Police on such a matter - re his conduct or plaintiff's counsel, I'm not quite sure. And Commissioner Haynes response? - he was only too happy to endorse Justice Gittos' stance of speak no evil against one's fellow brethren.
'Does this mean,' I asked the commissioner, 'if he himself was denied access to his office because his employer was in dispute with the landlord over unpaid rent, it was acceptable for me to write to other parties claiming the landlord was in dispute with Mr. Haynes over unpaid invoices ? And wouldn't such actions be considered libelous? '
My concerns were dismissed as irrelevant and frivolous.
Who judges the judges might be an age-old question, but one thing is for certain that person shouldn't be a member of the New Zealand legal profession.
Geoff Beach
Kohi, Auckland
So how does this office stack up in practice? Is it a genuine attempt to call judges to account for inappropriate behavior, or is it more like what Louise Nicolas experienced when she initially tried to lay a complaint - all too incestuous for comfort? Consider the following: -
In March 2000 I was unfortunate enough to be in the defendant in a civil action for breach of contract. The hearing was before Mr. Justice Gittos. A key witness-a warehouse manager-testified that counsel for the plaintiff had approached him with an affidavit to sign. This blatantly biased document claimed I converted my business partner's goods, which at the time were stored in this witness's warehouse. The plaintiff was in arrears by several thousand dollars in storage fees and it was implied by plaintiff's counsel (according to the manager) that if he cooperated then it would make a difference to this outstanding debt being settled. This damming revelation (in response to a direct question from defense counsel) was followed by a deafening silence. Yet no denial was ever issued by plaintiff's counsel- just a cry 'Your honor!' It can't be every day in court that one counsel is prepared to cast such a slur on their opposite number, so it makes even more remarkable that Justice Gittos chose to remain silent when it must have occurred to him that there might well be some substance to this allegation. The affidavit in question was undoubtedly genuine since it bore the legal firm's letterhead. Further, the affidavit appeared to have been drawn up ad hoc without prior consultation, then thrown down in front of the warehouse manager for signing -which raises the question what on earth gave plaintiff's counsel a reason to think the manager would cooperate with such a crass approach?
Under the statute that it operates, the Office of the Judicial Conduct Commissioner is obliged to refer complaints to the judge concerned for comment, unless considered frivolous; apparently my complaint was deemed worthy, albeit begrudgingly.
The response from Justice Gittos was astounding. He claimed that since both the plaintiff and the defendant were in dispute with the warehouse manager over unpaid invoices he felt constrained from perusing this matter further. To which I pointed out to the Commissioner that the warehouse manager himself had testified that there never had been any dispute with the defendant over unpaid invoices, and no evidence was ever given to the contrary. Rather than apologize the judge now attempted to defend the indefensible by claiming that since I was denied access to the manager's warehouse this amounted to the same thing! He went further and suggested I should have gone instead to the Law Society or Police on such a matter - re his conduct or plaintiff's counsel, I'm not quite sure. And Commissioner Haynes response? - he was only too happy to endorse Justice Gittos' stance of speak no evil against one's fellow brethren.
'Does this mean,' I asked the commissioner, 'if he himself was denied access to his office because his employer was in dispute with the landlord over unpaid rent, it was acceptable for me to write to other parties claiming the landlord was in dispute with Mr. Haynes over unpaid invoices ? And wouldn't such actions be considered libelous? '
My concerns were dismissed as irrelevant and frivolous.
Who judges the judges might be an age-old question, but one thing is for certain that person shouldn't be a member of the New Zealand legal profession.
Geoff Beach
Kohi, Auckland
So how does this office stack up in practice? Is it a genuine attempt to call judges to account for inappropriate behavior, or is it more like what Louise Nicolas experienced when she initially tried to lay a complaint - all too incestuous for comfort? Consider the following: -
In March 2000 I was unfortunate enough to be in the defendant in a civil action for breach of contract. The hearing was before Mr. Justice Gittos. A key witness-a warehouse manager-testified that counsel for the plaintiff had approached him with an affidavit to sign. This blatantly biased document claimed I converted my business partner's goods, which at the time were stored in this witness's warehouse. The plaintiff was in arrears by several thousand dollars in storage fees and it was implied by plaintiff's counsel (according to the manager) that if he cooperated then it would make a difference to this outstanding debt being settled. This damming revelation (in response to a direct question from defense counsel) was followed by a deafening silence. Yet no denial was ever issued by plaintiff's counsel- just a cry 'Your honor!' It can't be every day in court that one counsel is prepared to cast such a slur on their opposite number, so it makes even more remarkable that Justice Gittos chose to remain silent when it must have occurred to him that there might well be some substance to this allegation. The affidavit in question was undoubtedly genuine since it bore the legal firm's letterhead. Further, the affidavit appeared to have been drawn up ad hoc without prior consultation, then thrown down in front of the warehouse manager for signing -which raises the question what on earth gave plaintiff's counsel a reason to think the manager would cooperate with such a crass approach?
Under the statute that it operates, the Office of the Judicial Conduct Commissioner is obliged to refer complaints to the judge concerned for comment, unless considered frivolous; apparently my complaint was deemed worthy, albeit begrudgingly.
The response from Justice Gittos was astounding. He claimed that since both the plaintiff and the defendant were in dispute with the warehouse manager over unpaid invoices he felt constrained from perusing this matter further. To which I pointed out to the Commissioner that the warehouse manager himself had testified that there never had been any dispute with the defendant over unpaid invoices, and no evidence was ever given to the contrary. Rather than apologize the judge now attempted to defend the indefensible by claiming that since I was denied access to the manager's warehouse this amounted to the same thing! He went further and suggested I should have gone instead to the Law Society or Police on such a matter - re his conduct or plaintiff's counsel, I'm not quite sure. And Commissioner Haynes response? - he was only too happy to endorse Justice Gittos' stance of speak no evil against one's fellow brethren.
'Does this mean,' I asked the commissioner, 'if he himself was denied access to his office because his employer was in dispute with the landlord over unpaid rent, it was acceptable for me to write to other parties claiming the landlord was in dispute with Mr. Haynes over unpaid invoices ? And wouldn't such actions be considered libelous? '
My concerns were dismissed as irrelevant and frivolous.
Who judges the judges might be an age-old question, but one thing is for certain that person shouldn't be a member of the New Zealand legal profession.
Geoff Beach
Kohi, Auckland
So how does this office stack up in practice? Is it a genuine attempt to call judges to account for inappropriate behavior, or is it more like what Louise Nicolas experienced when she initially tried to lay a complaint - all too incestuous for comfort? Consider the following: -
In March 2000 I was unfortunate enough to be in the defendant in a civil action for breach of contract. The hearing was before Mr. Justice Gittos. A key witness-a warehouse manager-testified that counsel for the plaintiff had approached him with an affidavit to sign. This blatantly biased document claimed I converted my business partner's goods, which at the time were stored in this witness's warehouse. The plaintiff was in arrears by several thousand dollars in storage fees and it was implied by plaintiff's counsel (according to the manager) that if he cooperated then it would make a difference to this outstanding debt being settled. This damming revelation (in response to a direct question from defense counsel) was followed by a deafening silence. Yet no denial was ever issued by plaintiff's counsel- just a cry 'Your honor!' It can't be every day in court that one counsel is prepared to cast such a slur on their opposite number, so it makes even more remarkable that Justice Gittos chose to remain silent when it must have occurred to him that there might well be some substance to this allegation. The affidavit in question was undoubtedly genuine since it bore the legal firm's letterhead. Further, the affidavit appeared to have been drawn up ad hoc without prior consultation, then thrown down in front of the warehouse manager for signing -which raises the question what on earth gave plaintiff's counsel a reason to think the manager would cooperate with such a crass approach?
Under the statute that it operates, the Office of the Judicial Conduct Commissioner is obliged to refer complaints to the judge concerned for comment, unless considered frivolous; apparently my complaint was deemed worthy, albeit begrudgingly.
The response from Justice Gittos was astounding. He claimed that since both the plaintiff and the defendant were in dispute with the warehouse manager over unpaid invoices he felt constrained from perusing this matter further. To which I pointed out to the Commissioner that the warehouse manager himself had testified that there never had been any dispute with the defendant over unpaid invoices, and no evidence was ever given to the contrary. Rather than apologize the judge now attempted to defend the indefensible by claiming that since I was denied access to the manager's warehouse this amounted to the same thing! He went further and suggested I should have gone instead to the Law Society or Police on such a matter - re his conduct or plaintiff's counsel, I'm not quite sure. And Commissioner Haynes response? - he was only too happy to endorse Justice Gittos' stance of speak no evil against one's fellow brethren.
'Does this mean,' I asked the commissioner, 'if he himself was denied access to his office because his employer was in dispute with the landlord over unpaid rent, it was acceptable for me to write to other parties claiming the landlord was in dispute with Mr. Haynes over unpaid invoices ? And wouldn't such actions be considered libelous? '
My concerns were dismissed as irrelevant and frivolous.
Who judges the judges might be an age-old question, but one thing is for certain that person shouldn't be a member of the New Zealand legal profession.
Geoff Beach
Kohi, Auckland
So how does this office stack up in practice? Is it a genuine attempt to call judges to account for inappropriate behavior, or is it more like what Louise Nicolas experienced when she initially tried to lay a complaint - all too incestuous for comfort? Consider the following: -
In March 2000 I was unfortunate enough to be in the defendant in a civil action for breach of contract. The hearing was before Mr. Justice Gittos. A key witness-a warehouse manager-testified that counsel for the plaintiff had approached him with an affidavit to sign. This blatantly biased document claimed I converted my business partner's goods, which at the time were stored in this witness's warehouse. The plaintiff was in arrears by several thousand dollars in storage fees and it was implied by plaintiff's counsel (according to the manager) that if he cooperated then it would make a difference to this outstanding debt being settled. This damming revelation (in response to a direct question from defense counsel) was followed by a deafening silence. Yet no denial was ever issued by plaintiff's counsel- just a cry 'Your honor!' It can't be every day in court that one counsel is prepared to cast such a slur on their opposite number, so it makes even more remarkable that Justice Gittos chose to remain silent when it must have occurred to him that there might well be some substance to this allegation. The affidavit in question was undoubtedly genuine since it bore the legal firm's letterhead. Further, the affidavit appeared to have been drawn up ad hoc without prior consultation, then thrown down in front of the warehouse manager for signing -which raises the question what on earth gave plaintiff's counsel a reason to think the manager would cooperate with such a crass approach?
Under the statute that it operates, the Office of the Judicial Conduct Commissioner is obliged to refer complaints to the judge concerned for comment, unless considered frivolous; apparently my complaint was deemed worthy, albeit begrudgingly.
The response from Justice Gittos was astounding. He claimed that since both the plaintiff and the defendant were in dispute with the warehouse manager over unpaid invoices he felt constrained from perusing this matter further. To which I pointed out to the Commissioner that the warehouse manager himself had testified that there never had been any dispute with the defendant over unpaid invoices, and no evidence was ever given to the contrary. Rather than apologize the judge now attempted to defend the indefensible by claiming that since I was denied access to the manager's warehouse this amounted to the same thing! He went further and suggested I should have gone instead to the Law Society or Police on such a matter - re his conduct or plaintiff's counsel, I'm not quite sure. And Commissioner Haynes response? - he was only too happy to endorse Justice Gittos' stance of speak no evil against one's fellow brethren.
'Does this mean,' I asked the commissioner, 'if he himself was denied access to his office because his employer was in dispute with the landlord over unpaid rent, it was acceptable for me to write to other parties claiming the landlord was in dispute with Mr. Haynes over unpaid invoices ? And wouldn't such actions be considered libelous? '
My concerns were dismissed as irrelevant and frivolous.
Who judges the judges might be an age-old question, but one thing is for certain that person shouldn't be a member of the New Zealand legal profession.
Geoff Beach
Kohi, Auckland
So how does this office stack up in practice? Is it a genuine attempt to call judges to account for inappropriate behavior, or is it more like what Louise Nicolas experienced when she initially tried to lay a complaint - all too incestuous for comfort? Consider the following: -
In March 2000 I was unfortunate enough to be in the defendant in a civil action for breach of contract. The hearing was before Mr. Justice Gittos. A key witness-a warehouse manager-testified that counsel for the plaintiff had approached him with an affidavit to sign. This blatantly biased document claimed I converted my business partner's goods, which at the time were stored in this witness's warehouse. The plaintiff was in arrears by several thousand dollars in storage fees and it was implied by plaintiff's counsel (according to the manager) that if he cooperated then it would make a difference to this outstanding debt being settled. This damming revelation (in response to a direct question from defense counsel) was followed by a deafening silence. Yet no denial was ever issued by plaintiff's counsel- just a cry 'Your honor!' It can't be every day in court that one counsel is prepared to cast such a slur on their opposite number, so it makes even more remarkable that Justice Gittos chose to remain silent when it must have occurred to him that there might well be some substance to this allegation. The affidavit in question was undoubtedly genuine since it bore the legal firm's letterhead. Further, the affidavit appeared to have been drawn up ad hoc without prior consultation, then thrown down in front of the warehouse manager for signing -which raises the question what on earth gave plaintiff's counsel a reason to think the manager would cooperate with such a crass approach?
Under the statute that it operates, the Office of the Judicial Conduct Commissioner is obliged to refer complaints to the judge concerned for comment, unless considered frivolous; apparently my complaint was deemed worthy, albeit begrudgingly.
The response from Justice Gittos was astounding. He claimed that since both the plaintiff and the defendant were in dispute with the warehouse manager over unpaid invoices he felt constrained from perusing this matter further. To which I pointed out to the Commissioner that the warehouse manager himself had testified that there never had been any dispute with the defendant over unpaid invoices, and no evidence was ever given to the contrary. Rather than apologize the judge now attempted to defend the indefensible by claiming that since I was denied access to the manager's warehouse this amounted to the same thing! He went further and suggested I should have gone instead to the Law Society or Police on such a matter - re his conduct or plaintiff's counsel, I'm not quite sure. And Commissioner Haynes response? - he was only too happy to endorse Justice Gittos' stance of speak no evil against one's fellow brethren.
'Does this mean,' I asked the commissioner, 'if he himself was denied access to his office because his employer was in dispute with the landlord over unpaid rent, it was acceptable for me to write to other parties claiming the landlord was in dispute with Mr. Haynes over unpaid invoices ? And wouldn't such actions be considered libelous? '
My concerns were dismissed as irrelevant and frivolous.
Who judges the judges might be an age-old question, but one thing is for certain that person shouldn't be a member of the New Zealand legal profession.
Geoff Beach
Kohi, Auckland
So how does this office stack up in practice? Is it a genuine attempt to call judges to account for inappropriate behavior, or is it more like what Louise Nicolas experienced when she initially tried to lay a complaint - all too incestuous for comfort? Consider the following: -
In March 2000 I was unfortunate enough to be in the defendant in a civil action for breach of contract. The hearing was before Mr. Justice Gittos. A key witness-a warehouse manager-testified that counsel for the plaintiff had approached him with an affidavit to sign. This blatantly biased document claimed I converted my business partner's goods, which at the time were stored in this witness's warehouse. The plaintiff was in arrears by several thousand dollars in storage fees and it was implied by plaintiff's counsel (according to the manager) that if he cooperated then it would make a difference to this outstanding debt being settled. This damming revelation (in response to a direct question from defense counsel) was followed by a deafening silence. Yet no denial was ever issued by plaintiff's counsel- just a cry 'Your honor!' It can't be every day in court that one counsel is prepared to cast such a slur on their opposite number, so it makes even more remarkable that Justice Gittos chose to remain silent when it must have occurred to him that there might well be some substance to this allegation. The affidavit in question was undoubtedly genuine since it bore the legal firm's letterhead. Further, the affidavit appeared to have been drawn up ad hoc without prior consultation, then thrown down in front of the warehouse manager for signing -which raises the question what on earth gave plaintiff's counsel a reason to think the manager would cooperate with such a crass approach?
Under the statute that it operates, the Office of the Judicial Conduct Commissioner is obliged to refer complaints to the judge concerned for comment, unless considered frivolous; apparently my complaint was deemed worthy, albeit begrudgingly.
The response from Justice Gittos was astounding. He claimed that since both the plaintiff and the defendant were in dispute with the warehouse manager over unpaid invoices he felt constrained from perusing this matter further. To which I pointed out to the Commissioner that the warehouse manager himself had testified that there never had been any dispute with the defendant over unpaid invoices, and no evidence was ever given to the contrary. Rather than apologize the judge now attempted to defend the indefensible by claiming that since I was denied access to the manager's warehouse this amounted to the same thing! He went further and suggested I should have gone instead to the Law Society or Police on such a matter - re his conduct or plaintiff's counsel, I'm not quite sure. And Commissioner Haynes response? - he was only too happy to endorse Justice Gittos' stance of speak no evil against one's fellow brethren.
'Does this mean,' I asked the commissioner, 'if he himself was denied access to his office because his employer was in dispute with the landlord over unpaid rent, it was acceptable for me to write to other parties claiming the landlord was in dispute with Mr. Haynes over unpaid invoices ? And wouldn't such actions be considered libelous? '
My concerns were dismissed as irrelevant and frivolous.
Who judges the judges might be an age-old question, but one thing is for certain that person shouldn't be a member of the New Zealand legal profession.
Geoff Beach
Kohi, Auckland
So how does this office stack up in practice? Is it a genuine attempt to call judges to account for inappropriate behavior, or is it more like what Louise Nicolas experienced when she initially tried to lay a complaint - all too incestuous for comfort? Consider the following: -
In March 2000 I was unfortunate enough to be in the defendant in a civil action for breach of contract. The hearing was before Mr. Justice Gittos. A key witness-a warehouse manager-testified that counsel for the plaintiff had approached him with an affidavit to sign. This blatantly biased document claimed I converted my business partner's goods, which at the time were stored in this witness's warehouse. The plaintiff was in arrears by several thousand dollars in storage fees and it was implied by plaintiff's counsel (according to the manager) that if he cooperated then it would make a difference to this outstanding debt being settled. This damming revelation (in response to a direct question from defense counsel) was followed by a deafening silence. Yet no denial was ever issued by plaintiff's counsel- just a cry 'Your honor!' It can't be every day in court that one counsel is prepared to cast such a slur on their opposite number, so it makes even more remarkable that Justice Gittos chose to remain silent when it must have occurred to him that there might well be some substance to this allegation. The affidavit in question was undoubtedly genuine since it bore the legal firm's letterhead. Further, the affidavit appeared to have been drawn up ad hoc without prior consultation, then thrown down in front of the warehouse manager for signing -which raises the question what on earth gave plaintiff's counsel a reason to think the manager would cooperate with such a crass approach?
Under the statute that it operates, the Office of the Judicial Conduct Commissioner is obliged to refer complaints to the judge concerned for comment, unless considered frivolous; apparently my complaint was deemed worthy, albeit begrudgingly.
The response from Justice Gittos was astounding. He claimed that since both the plaintiff and the defendant were in dispute with the warehouse manager over unpaid invoices he felt constrained from perusing this matter further. To which I pointed out to the Commissioner that the warehouse manager himself had testified that there never had been any dispute with the defendant over unpaid invoices, and no evidence was ever given to the contrary. Rather than apologize the judge now attempted to defend the indefensible by claiming that since I was denied access to the manager's warehouse this amounted to the same thing! He went further and suggested I should have gone instead to the Law Society or Police on such a matter - re his conduct or plaintiff's counsel, I'm not quite sure. And Commissioner Haynes response? - he was only too happy to endorse Justice Gittos' stance of speak no evil against one's fellow brethren.
'Does this mean,' I asked the commissioner, 'if he himself was denied access to his office because his employer was in dispute with the landlord over unpaid rent, it was acceptable for me to write to other parties claiming the landlord was in dispute with Mr. Haynes over unpaid invoices ? And wouldn't such actions be considered libelous? '
My concerns were dismissed as irrelevant and frivolous.
Who judges the judges might be an age-old question, but one thing is for certain that person shouldn't be a member of the New Zealand legal profession.
Geoff Beach
Kohi, Auckland
So how does this office stack up in practice? Is it a genuine attempt to call judges to account for inappropriate behavior, or is it more like what Louise Nicolas experienced when she initially tried to lay a complaint - all too incestuous for comfort? Consider the following: -
In March 2000 I was unfortunate enough to be in the defendant in a civil action for breach of contract. The hearing was before Mr. Justice Gittos. A key witness-a warehouse manager-testified that counsel for the plaintiff had approached him with an affidavit to sign. This blatantly biased document claimed I converted my business partner's goods, which at the time were stored in this witness's warehouse. The plaintiff was in arrears by several thousand dollars in storage fees and it was implied by plaintiff's counsel (according to the manager) that if he cooperated then it would make a difference to this outstanding debt being settled. This damming revelation (in response to a direct question from defense counsel) was followed by a deafening silence. Yet no denial was ever issued by plaintiff's counsel- just a cry 'Your honor!' It can't be every day in court that one counsel is prepared to cast such a slur on their opposite number, so it makes even more remarkable that Justice Gittos chose to remain silent when it must have occurred to him that there might well be some substance to this allegation. The affidavit in question was undoubtedly genuine since it bore the legal firm's letterhead. Further, the affidavit appeared to have been drawn up ad hoc without prior consultation, then thrown down in front of the warehouse manager for signing -which raises the question what on earth gave plaintiff's counsel a reason to think the manager would cooperate with such a crass approach?
Under the statute that it operates, the Office of the Judicial Conduct Commissioner is obliged to refer complaints to the judge concerned for comment, unless considered frivolous; apparently my complaint was deemed worthy, albeit begrudgingly.
The response from Justice Gittos was astounding. He claimed that since both the plaintiff and the defendant were in dispute with the warehouse manager over unpaid invoices he felt constrained from perusing this matter further. To which I pointed out to the Commissioner that the warehouse manager himself had testified that there never had been any dispute with the defendant over unpaid invoices, and no evidence was ever given to the contrary. Rather than apologize the judge now attempted to defend the indefensible by claiming that since I was denied access to the manager's warehouse this amounted to the same thing! He went further and suggested I should have gone instead to the Law Society or Police on such a matter - re his conduct or plaintiff's counsel, I'm not quite sure. And Commissioner Haynes response? - he was only too happy to endorse Justice Gittos' stance of speak no evil against one's fellow brethren.
'Does this mean,' I asked the commissioner, 'if he himself was denied access to his office because his employer was in dispute with the landlord over unpaid rent, it was acceptable for me to write to other parties claiming the landlord was in dispute with Mr. Haynes over unpaid invoices ? And wouldn't such actions be considered libelous? '
My concerns were dismissed as irrelevant and frivolous.
Who judges the judges might be an age-old question, but one thing is for certain that person shouldn't be a member of the New Zealand legal profession.
Geoff Beach
Kohi, Auckland
So how does this office stack up in practice? Is it a genuine attempt to call judges to account for inappropriate behavior, or is it more like what Louise Nicolas experienced when she initially tried to lay a complaint - all too incestuous for comfort? Consider the following: -
In March 2000 I was unfortunate enough to be in the defendant in a civil action for breach of contract. The hearing was before Mr. Justice Gittos. A key witness-a warehouse manager-testified that counsel for the plaintiff had approached him with an affidavit to sign. This blatantly biased document claimed I converted my business partner's goods, which at the time were stored in this witness's warehouse. The plaintiff was in arrears by several thousand dollars in storage fees and it was implied by plaintiff's counsel (according to the manager) that if he cooperated then it would make a difference to this outstanding debt being settled. This damming revelation (in response to a direct question from defense counsel) was followed by a deafening silence. Yet no denial was ever issued by plaintiff's counsel- just a cry 'Your honor!' It can't be every day in court that one counsel is prepared to cast such a slur on their opposite number, so it makes even more remarkable that Justice Gittos chose to remain silent when it must have occurred to him that there might well be some substance to this allegation. The affidavit in question was undoubtedly genuine since it bore the legal firm's letterhead. Further, the affidavit appeared to have been drawn up ad hoc without prior consultation, then thrown down in front of the warehouse manager for signing -which raises the question what on earth gave plaintiff's counsel a reason to think the manager would cooperate with such a crass approach?
Under the statute that it operates, the Office of the Judicial Conduct Commissioner is obliged to refer complaints to the judge concerned for comment, unless considered frivolous; apparently my complaint was deemed worthy, albeit begrudgingly.
The response from Justice Gittos was astounding. He claimed that since both the plaintiff and the defendant were in dispute with the warehouse manager over unpaid invoices he felt constrained from perusing this matter further. To which I pointed out to the Commissioner that the warehouse manager himself had testified that there never had been any dispute with the defendant over unpaid invoices, and no evidence was ever given to the contrary. Rather than apologize the judge now attempted to defend the indefensible by claiming that since I was denied access to the manager's warehouse this amounted to the same thing! He went further and suggested I should have gone instead to the Law Society or Police on such a matter - re his conduct or plaintiff's counsel, I'm not quite sure. And Commissioner Haynes response? - he was only too happy to endorse Justice Gittos' stance of speak no evil against one's fellow brethren.
'Does this mean,' I asked the commissioner, 'if he himself was denied access to his office because his employer was in dispute with the landlord over unpaid rent, it was acceptable for me to write to other parties claiming the landlord was in dispute with Mr. Haynes over unpaid invoices ? And wouldn't such actions be considered libelous? '
My concerns were dismissed as irrelevant and frivolous.
Who judges the judges might be an age-old question, but one thing is for certain that person shouldn't be a member of the New Zealand legal profession.
Geoff Beach
Kohi, Auckland
So how does this office stack up in practice? Is it a genuine attempt to call judges to account for inappropriate behavior, or is it more like what Louise Nicolas experienced when she initially tried to lay a complaint - all too incestuous for comfort? Consider the following: -
In March 2000 I was unfortunate enough to be in the defendant in a civil action for breach of contract. The hearing was before Mr. Justice Gittos. A key witness-a warehouse manager-testified that counsel for the plaintiff had approached him with an affidavit to sign. This blatantly biased document claimed I converted my business partner's goods, which at the time were stored in this witness's warehouse. The plaintiff was in arrears by several thousand dollars in storage fees and it was implied by plaintiff's counsel (according to the manager) that if he cooperated then it would make a difference to this outstanding debt being settled. This damming revelation (in response to a direct question from defense counsel) was followed by a deafening silence. Yet no denial was ever issued by plaintiff's counsel- just a cry 'Your honor!' It can't be every day in court that one counsel is prepared to cast such a slur on their opposite number, so it makes even more remarkable that Justice Gittos chose to remain silent when it must have occurred to him that there might well be some substance to this allegation. The affidavit in question was undoubtedly genuine since it bore the legal firm's letterhead. Further, the affidavit appeared to have been drawn up ad hoc without prior consultation, then thrown down in front of the warehouse manager for signing -which raises the question what on earth gave plaintiff's counsel a reason to think the manager would cooperate with such a crass approach?
Under the statute that it operates, the Office of the Judicial Conduct Commissioner is obliged to refer complaints to the judge concerned for comment, unless considered frivolous; apparently my complaint was deemed worthy, albeit begrudgingly.
The response from Justice Gittos was astounding. He claimed that since both the plaintiff and the defendant were in dispute with the warehouse manager over unpaid invoices he felt constrained from perusing this matter further. To which I pointed out to the Commissioner that the warehouse manager himself had testified that there never had been any dispute with the defendant over unpaid invoices, and no evidence was ever given to the contrary. Rather than apologize the judge now attempted to defend the indefensible by claiming that since I was denied access to the manager's warehouse this amounted to the same thing! He went further and suggested I should have gone instead to the Law Society or Police on such a matter - re his conduct or plaintiff's counsel, I'm not quite sure. And Commissioner Haynes response? - he was only too happy to endorse Justice Gittos' stance of speak no evil against one's fellow brethren.
'Does this mean,' I asked the commissioner, 'if he himself was denied access to his office because his employer was in dispute with the landlord over unpaid rent, it was acceptable for me to write to other parties claiming the landlord was in dispute with Mr. Haynes over unpaid invoices ? And wouldn't such actions be considered libelous? '
My concerns were dismissed as irrelevant and frivolous.
Who judges the judges might be an age-old question, but one thing is for certain that person shouldn't be a member of the New Zealand legal profession.
Geoff Beach
Kohi, Auckland
IMMUNITY FROM SUIT ? - A CRUTCH FOR THE SUPINE
By: Colin Henry J.D. dateline: 24 May 2007
Mrs. Catriona McLennan provided a very useful summary of the criticisms that have been levelled at the Supreme Court's abolition of Barristerial immunity (Law News Issue 35, 15 Sept. 2006). None of those criticisms amount to anything other than fatuous excuses for sheltering a privileged profession from the consequences of their own professional indolence. I have no doubt that if doctors had the power, knowing intimately as they do the unpleasant consequences of illness, they would contrive an immunity for themselves from all illnesses and diseases. The arguments for retention of Barristerial immunity amount to nothing less fanciful.
According to Ms. McLennan, Dr. Farmer QC laments that abolition of the immunity will create expectations unlikely to be fulfilled. While Dr. Farmer's tender concern for the sensibilities of the "unlearned" public is indeed touching, he did not, because he cannot, cite any empirical evidence in support of this subject of his concern. The lone case in the UK to which he refers can hardly serve to support his conclusion. "One swallow does not make a summer". I, for one, would be more amenable to conviction by Dr. Farmer's epicedium had he taken the trouble to provide supporting information from jurisdictions in which Barristerial immunity, if it ever existed, is now lost in the fog of the past. Canada and the United States come readily to mind. In any event, even if Dr. Farmer were correct, the provision of legal remedies is about neither the creation nor the dampening of expectations, but about justice.
Dr Farmer is said also to be concerned that before suits are brought against Barristers, appeals will have to go all the way to the Supreme Court in every case. I am thankful to Dr. Farmer for this postulate, as it exposes the weakness of the premise on which his criticisms of the abolition of the immunity is based. The predicate for a cause of action against barristers will not be the loss of a lawsuit. It will arise when a barrister has provided service to his client at a standard below that generally considered to be adequate within the profession. Whether or not the case concerned was lost will simply be the measure of loss caused by that dereliction and one of the determinants of damages.
As to the possibility of claims against Barristers being struck out, I am sure that Dr. Farmer well knows, from his immense experience, that that is part of the litigation risk attendant upon virtually every proceeding. If the presence of that risk were to preclude the prosecution of claims, then the civil courts might as well abolish themselves, as there would be nothing for them to do. On a serious note, however, persons daily make decisions which result in good money being thrown after bad. Once again, Dr. Farmer's solicitude for the financial wisdom of the public is quite touching. Still, legal principles ought to be informed by the need to ensure the availability of justice, and not, like Dr Farmer's concern, by the desire to teach financial husbandry.
The final stanza in Dr. Farmer's threnody censures the Supreme Court's decision for its encouragement of hopeless cases. If the logic of this reasoning were to be adopted, then since the majority of appeals to the Court of Appeal are unsuccessful, the right to appeal ought to be abolished, as it encourages hopeless appeals. If Dr. Farmer steps back from his visceral reaction to abolition of Barristerial immunity, I am sure he will see that the only encouragement it will in fact provide is to Barristers to deliver a level of service commensurate with the community's expectations of them.
Disappointingly, our own President, Gary Gottlieb, adds his own Dies Irae to Dr. Farmer's requiem. He warns that he will now be too busy for "difficult clients". As I quite like Gary, I am so happy for him, to hear this, because he ought to have been saying that to such clients long before immunity was abolished. It is a wise practitioner who threshes his potential clients. Wheat from the chaff, and all that.
My first instinct, in response to another of Gary's dire predictions is to say, woe to the judicial system, now that "litigious, self-represented litigants [will] be 'issuing proceedings all over the place'". But, on second thought, it occurs to me that if those litigants will be issuing their proceedings "all over the place" then the courts need not be worried, since such litigants would not be troubling them.
I remain an active member of two Unites States jurisdictions, and I can't recall any knowledge of self-represented litigants taking out proceedings in places other than the courts, simply because advocates are not immune, and neither have the courts had to deal with a flood of proceedings from such litigants. However, if Gary has information otherwise, then he should share it with the rest of the profession, so that we can be appropriately armed.
Our President asks a most sensible question, when he queries why Barristers should lose their immunity while judges retain theirs. That question, however, derives its cogency not, as Gary would suggest, from the unfairness of the new status quo, but from the injustice of permitting judges to violate law and standards without adequate remedy available to those harmed by their actions. Unlike judges, Barristers are agents of their clients and owe duties accordingly. On the other hand, judges owe a duty to society, whose agents they are, as well as a duty to the litigants appearing before them, to apply the law fairly and in accordance with the promises in the Judicial Oath. There is no more logical reason to shelter judges from the consequences of violating those duties than there is to shelter Barristers from the consequences of their own negligence. Justice Elias' dismissal of the need for finality in litigation and avoiding abusive collateral challenge as justifications of Barristerial immunity applies no less to their use to support judicial immunity.
As to the issue of unfairness because Barristers will now be open to suit while being unable to sue their clients, because of "the intervention rule" (whatever that is), my understanding is that except in a very limited class of cases, Barristers are obliged to act under Solicitors' instructions. Their fees are thus owed to them by their instructing solicitors. Where the client defaults, I know of no rule preventing a Solicitor from suing to recover a fee.
It is good to see our Supreme Court putting principle first in an issue which could easily have resulted in a self-serving decision. I look forward to the continuing evolution of our jurisprudence in that direction.#
Mr. Henry is a Barrister sole practising in New Zealand. The Auckland District Law Society refused to publish this article in its weekly publication. Mrs. Catriona McLennan provided a very useful summary of the criticisms that have been levelled at the Supreme Court's abolition of Barristerial immunity (Law News Issue 35, 15 Sept. 2006). None of those criticisms amount to anything other than fatuous excuses for sheltering a privileged profession from the consequences of their own professional indolence. I have no doubt that if doctors had the power, knowing intimately as they do the unpleasant consequences of illness, they would contrive an immunity for themselves from all illnesses and diseases. The arguments for retention of Barristerial immunity amount to nothing less fanciful.
According to Ms. McLennan, Dr. Farmer QC laments that abolition of the immunity will create expectations unlikely to be fulfilled. While Dr. Farmer's tender concern for the sensibilities of the "unlearned" public is indeed touching, he did not, because he cannot, cite any empirical evidence in support of this subject of his concern. The lone case in the UK to which he refers can hardly serve to support his conclusion. "One swallow does not make a summer". I, for one, would be more amenable to conviction by Dr. Farmer's epicedium had he taken the trouble to provide supporting information from jurisdictions in which Barristerial immunity, if it ever existed, is now lost in the fog of the past. Canada and the United States come readily to mind. In any event, even if Dr. Farmer were correct, the provision of legal remedies is about neither the creation nor the dampening of expectations, but about justice.
Dr Farmer is said also to be concerned that before suits are brought against Barristers, appeals will have to go all the way to the Supreme Court in every case. I am thankful to Dr. Farmer for this postulate, as it exposes the weakness of the premise on which his criticisms of the abolition of the immunity is based. The predicate for a cause of action against barristers will not be the loss of a lawsuit. It will arise when a barrister has provided service to his client at a standard below that generally considered to be adequate within the profession. Whether or not the case concerned was lost will simply be the measure of loss caused by that dereliction and one of the determinants of damages.
As to the possibility of claims against Barristers being struck out, I am sure that Dr. Farmer well knows, from his immense experience, that that is part of the litigation risk attendant upon virtually every proceeding. If the presence of that risk were to preclude the prosecution of claims, then the civil courts might as well abolish themselves, as there would be nothing for them to do. On a serious note, however, persons daily make decisions which result in good money being thrown after bad. Once again, Dr. Farmer's solicitude for the financial wisdom of the public is quite touching. Still, legal principles ought to be informed by the need to ensure the availability of justice, and not, like Dr Farmer's concern, by the desire to teach financial husbandry.
The final stanza in Dr. Farmer's threnody censures the Supreme Court's decision for its encouragement of hopeless cases. If the logic of this reasoning were to be adopted, then since the majority of appeals to the Court of Appeal are unsuccessful, the right to appeal ought to be abolished, as it encourages hopeless appeals. If Dr. Farmer steps back from his visceral reaction to abolition of Barristerial immunity, I am sure he will see that the only encouragement it will in fact provide is to Barristers to deliver a level of service commensurate with the community's expectations of them.
Disappointingly, our own President, Gary Gottlieb, adds his own Dies Irae to Dr. Farmer's requiem. He warns that he will now be too busy for "difficult clients". As I quite like Gary, I am so happy for him, to hear this, because he ought to have been saying that to such clients long before immunity was abolished. It is a wise practitioner who threshes his potential clients. Wheat from the chaff, and all that.
My first instinct, in response to another of Gary's dire predictions is to say, woe to the judicial system, now that "litigious, self-represented litigants [will] be 'issuing proceedings all over the place'". But, on second thought, it occurs to me that if those litigants will be issuing their proceedings "all over the place" then the courts need not be worried, since such litigants would not be troubling them.
I remain an active member of two Unites States jurisdictions, and I can't recall any knowledge of self-represented litigants taking out proceedings in places other than the courts, simply because advocates are not immune, and neither have the courts had to deal with a flood of proceedings from such litigants. However, if Gary has information otherwise, then he should share it with the rest of the profession, so that we can be appropriately armed.
Our President asks a most sensible question, when he queries why Barristers should lose their immunity while judges retain theirs. That question, however, derives its cogency not, as Gary would suggest, from the unfairness of the new status quo, but from the injustice of permitting judges to violate law and standards without adequate remedy available to those harmed by their actions. Unlike judges, Barristers are agents of their clients and owe duties accordingly. On the other hand, judges owe a duty to society, whose agents they are, as well as a duty to the litigants appearing before them, to apply the law fairly and in accordance with the promises in the Judicial Oath. There is no more logical reason to shelter judges from the consequences of violating those duties than there is to shelter Barristers from the consequences of their own negligence. Justice Elias' dismissal of the need for finality in litigation and avoiding abusive collateral challenge as justifications of Barristerial immunity applies no less to their use to support judicial immunity.
As to the issue of unfairness because Barristers will now be open to suit while being unable to sue their clients, because of "the intervention rule" (whatever that is), my understanding is that except in a very limited class of cases, Barristers are obliged to act under Solicitors' instructions. Their fees are thus owed to them by their instructing solicitors. Where the client defaults, I know of no rule preventing a Solicitor from suing to recover a fee.
It is good to see our Supreme Court putting principle first in an issue which could easily have resulted in a self-serving decision. I look forward to the continuing evolution of our jurisprudence in that direction.#
Mr. Henry is a Barrister sole practising in New Zealand. The Auckland District Law Society refused to publish this article in its weekly publication.
PARKING TICKETS CASH COW FOR AUCKLAND CITY |
ALBERT PARK THREATENED BY DEVELOPMENT |
|
Dear Editior,
Congratulations on your web site and your commitment to exposing incompetence and corruption within our justice system, and local and central government. I have encountered a little of it myself, and have found the experience completely life-changing.
Before my experience with the courts, I believed, like most New Zealanders, that we had a working and relatively reliable Justice System, based on the purportedly excellent British system, and equal to the best in the world. Admitedly, I was apathetic, not interested in the issues that did not directly affect me, and thought I didn´t need to concern myself.
Nearly a decade later, I know the truth is very different. It is now clear to me that not only is our legal system often designed to thwart the justice process, almost no one within the system gives a damn. Most judges and lawyers seem thoroughly inured to the fact that the system is not fair, and frequently doesn´t come close to delivering justice.
My education began in 2001, when I received a $40 parking ticket for about 10 minutes parking without purchasing a Parking Receipt. When I read the
relevant law, it was clear to me that the correct fine was $12, not $40, so I defended the charge in the District Court.
I was on firm legal ground. The two JPs presiding ruled that I was correct, and that I should pay $12. Having set a precedent, from that point, the fine should be $12 for that offence. The Council declared its intention to appeal, but no appeal ensued... Little did I know, that was just the beginning.
To make sure that the Council was complying with the Court´s ruling, I deliberately collected another ticket for the same offence. To my surprise, the fine was still $40. The Auckland City Council was disobeying the Court decision. How? I investigated...
What I found was pure legal chicanery. Although the Court had correctly ruled on the meaning and the spirit of the applicable law, the Council already knew that it was onto a million-dollar-a-year winner. It wasn´t about to give that up. Instead, the Council found a legal way to flout the law by changing one word of the charge from "current" to "valid". Ethics, justice, or what is right obviously had nothing to do with it.
A Candy
Aka The Parking Rebel
Grey Lynn
|
Dear Editor,
I lodged an appeal in the Environment Court against Auckland City's plans to hack into historic Albert Park and quite a few beautiful mature trees in order to construct a most unsuitable building as an extension to the Auckland Art Gallery on Kichener Street.
Mediation with the Auckland City after the farcical consultation process was useless - the three Commissioners engaged by the City for consultations effectively handed all responsibility back to the City to interpret as it chose. While the backers preferred everyone focus on the controversial design produced for the site, the real issue lies in the enormity of the piece of parkland being, I consider, misappropriated for the purpose. Auckland City's claims that the effects would be minor were the understatement of the year. The design concept produced at the hearings did not appear to be drawn to scale, with the effect that no one could be held responsible for the extent of intrusion into the park for what was essentially a big private party room.
I have engaged a barrister who in turn has called on two expert consultants. I am told if I can find sufficient people opposed to the development, an application can be made to the Ministry of the Environment for limited assistance on costs to fight this.
I have no personal vested interest in this fight, just a desire to hold Auckland City accountable to the laws that protect this historic Park. I would appreciate a show of hands before it is too late.
Best regards,
C. Van Camp
Remuera
To express support, contact cvc@slingshot.co.nz
JADED TRUTH
Dear Editor,
I lost faith in the media when I was a successful industry figure whom reporters sought out periodically for input on relevant news stories of the day. Without exception, the reporter always had their angle on the story determined before we met or spoke. This invariably led to the story taking certain 'sound bites' out of our conversation - and out of context - when my input differed at all with the angle the reporter had predetermined. This experience has proven to be of great value in my ability to read between the lines of stories I see in newspapers today.
N.W.
Whangaparaoa
| In the name and on behalf of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth
the Second I hereby assent to this Act this 20th day
of March 2006
Governor-General.
Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006
Public Act 2006 No 1
Contents
Page
1 Title 15
2 Commencement 15
Part 1
Preliminary provisions
3 Purposes 15
4 Fundamental obligations of lawyers 16
5 Fundamental obligations of conveyancing practitioners 16
6 Interpretation 17
7 Misconduct defined in relation to lawyer and incor- 29
porated law firm
8 Misconduct defined in relation to conveyancing practi- 31
tioner and incorporated conveyancing firm
9 Misconduct defined in relation to provision of regulated 32
services by employees
10 Exceptions to section 9 33
11 Misconduct defined in relation to employees who are not 35
practitioners
12 Unsatisfactory conduct defined in relation to lawyers and 35
incorporated law firms
13 Unsatisfactory conduct defined in relation to conveyanc- 36
ing practitioners and incorporated conveyancing firms
14 Unsatisfactory conduct defined in relation to employees 37
who are not practitioners
15 Directors and shareholders of incorporated firms 37
16 Shareholders of incorporated firms 38
1
Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 2006 No 1
17 Liabilities of director or shareholder of incorporated firm 39
18 Liability of lawyer principals in respect of pecuniary loss 39
by reason of theft
19 Liability of conveyancing practitioner principals in 41
respect of pecuniary loss by reason of theft
20 Act to bind the Crown 42
Part 2
Restrictions on provision of legal services and
conveyancing services
Legal services
21 Provision of legal services 42
22 Misleading descriptions 42
23 False or misleading representations in relation to supply 43
of legal services
24 Reserved areas of work for lawyers and incorporated law 44
firms
25 Lawyers of other jurisdictions 44
26 Drafting court documents 45
27 Exceptions to sections 21, 22, 24, and 26 46
28 Proceedings in respect of offences against any provision 47
of sections 21 to 24
29 Contempt of court 48
30 Practice by lawyer on his or her own account 48
31 Exceptions to section 30 48
Conveyancing services
32 Provision of conveyancing services 50
33 Misleading descriptions 50
34 Proceedings in respect of offence against section 32 or 50
section 33
35 Practice of conveyancing 51
36 Exceptions to sections 32, 33, and 35 52
37 Practice by conveyancing practitioner on his or her own 53
account
38 Exceptions to section 37 54
Practising certificates
39 Issue of practising certificates 54
40 Effect of application for practising certificate 55
41 Power to refuse to issue practising certificate 56
42 Right to appeal 57
Injunctions
43 Injunctions 58
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2006 No 1 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006
Appointment of agent to conduct sole practice or act as
board of incorporated firm
44 Practitioners to whom Schedule 1 applies 58
45 Offences 59
Penalty
46 Penalty 59
Provisions not affected
47 Provisions not affected 59
Part 3
Admission and enrolment of barristers and solicitors
Admission of barristers and solicitors
48 Admission as barrister and solicitor 60
49 Qualifications 60
50 Evidence of qualifications 61
51 Evidence of suitability 61
52 Admission 62
53 Reciprocal admission 62
54 Rules of court as to admission 63
55 Fit and proper person 63
Roll of barristers and solicitors
56 Registrar to keep roll of barristers and solicitors 65
57 Enrolment 65
58 Striking off and restoration of names by order of Disci- 66
plinary Tribunal or High Court
59 Removal from roll if deemed registration ceases in some 66
circumstances
60 Voluntary removal of name from roll, and restoration 67
61 Supply of information 67
62 Admission and restoration fees 67
Part 4
New Zealand Law Society
63 Continuation of New Zealand Law Society 67
64 Membership 68
Functions
65 Regulatory functions 68
66 Representative functions 69
Powers
67 Regulatory powers 69
68 Representative powers 70
69 Power to borrow 71
70 Constitution of New Zealand Law Society 71
3
Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 2006 No 1
71 Registration of constitution and amendments to 72
constitution
72 Application of Acts and Regulations Publication Act 72
1989 and Regulations (Disallowance) Act 1989
73 Practising fees 72
74 Levies 73
75 Subscriptions 73
76 Annual report 74
Part 5
New Zealand Society of Conveyancers
77 Establishment of New Zealand Society of Conveyancers 74
78 Membership 75
Functions
79 Regulatory functions 75
80 Representative functions 75
Powers
81 Regulatory powers 76
82 Rules for registration of conveyancers 77
83 Fit and proper person 78
84 Rules relating to education 80
85 Representative powers 81
86 Power to borrow 82
87 Constitution of New Zealand Society of Conveyancers 82
88 Registration of constitution and amendments to 83
constitution
89 Application of Acts and Regulations Publication Act 83
1989 and Regulations (Disallowance) Act 1989
90 Practising fees 83
91 Levies 84
92 Subscriptions 85
93 Annual report 85
Part 6
Conduct of practice by practitioners
Practice rules and regulations
94 Practice rules 86
95 Code of professional conduct and client care 87
96 Practice rules in relation to nominee companies 87
97 Certain practice rules in relation to lawyers 88
98 Certain practice rules in relation to conveyancing 88
practitioners
99 Indemnity rules 89
100 Consultation in relation to rules 90
4
2006 No 1 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006
101 Criteria in relation to approval of practice rules by 91
Minister
102 Registration of practice rules 91
103 Amendment of rules 91
104 Power of Minister to amend rules 92
105 Registration of amendments to rules 92
106 Application of Acts and Regulations Publication Act 92
1989 and Regulations (Disallowance) Act 1989 to rules
107 Effect of practice rules 93
108 Regulations in relation to practitioners 93
Investigations
109 Investigation of affairs of practices 93
Trust accounts
110 Obligation to pay money received into trust account at 94
bank
111 Obligation to account for trust money and valuable 95
property
112 Obligation to keep records in respect of trust accounts 96
and valuable property
113 Protection of money received 97
114 Duty of practitioners to ensure that funds earn interest 97
115 Regulations relating to trust accounts 98
116 Provisions relating to regulations relating to trust 101
accounts
Barristers, Senior Counsel, and Queen's Counsel
117 Status of barristers 103
118 Office of Queen's Counsel to be known as Senior 103
Counsel
119 Power to make regulations in relation to Senior Counsel 104
and Queen's Counsel
Part 7
Complaints and discipline
120 Purposes 105
Complaints service
121 Obligation to establish complaints service 106
122 Rules 107
123 Administration of complaints service 107
124 Functions of New Zealand Law Society in relation to 107
complaints service
125 Functions of New Zealand Society of Conveyancers in 108
relation to complaints service
5
Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 2006 No 1
Standards Committees
126 Lawyers Standards Committees 109
127 Conveyancing Practitioners Standards Committees 109
128 Notice to Minister 109
129 Membership of Standards Committees 110
130 Functions of Standards Committees 110
131 Rules relating to Standards Committees 111
Complaints
132 Complaints about practitioners, incorporated firms, and 112
their employees
133 Complaint of failure to comply with order or final 113
determination
134 Complaint to be in writing 113
135 Appropriate complaints service 113
136 Complaint by Law Society or Society of Conveyancers 114
137 Action on receipt of complaint 114
138 Decision to take no action on complaint 114
139 Notice of decision 115
140 Inquiry by Standards Committee 116
141 Notice to person to whom complaint or inquiry relates 116
142 Procedure of Standards Committee 116
143 Negotiation, conciliation, and mediation 116
144 Power to appoint investigators 118
145 Instrument of appointment 118
146 Investigations by investigators 119
147 Powers of investigation 120
148 Report to Standards Committee 122
149 Disclosure of report 122
150 Discretion in relation to contents of report 123
151 Evidence 124
152 Power of Standards Committee to determine complaint 124
or matter
153 Hearings on the papers 125
154 Reference of complaint or matter to Disciplinary 126
Tribunal
155 Application for suspension of practitioner 127
156 Power of Standards Committee to make orders 127
157 Further power to make order for payment of costs 130
158 Notice of determination 131
159 Power to notify Registrar-General of Land 131
160 Complaints by beneficiaries in relation to costs 132
161 Stay of proceedings for recovery of costs 132
Intervention in practice
162 Purpose 133
6
2006 No 1 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006
163 Circumstances justifying intervention 133
164 Intervention in relation to regulated trust accounts 135
165 Administration of funds obtained from regulated trust 135
accounts
166 Claims in respect of money paid to Standards Committee 136
167 Power of Standards Committee to repay money 136
168 Directions relating to Fidelity Scheme 136
169 Power to take possession of money, property, records, 137
and documents
170 Power in relation to postal articles and email 137
communications
171 Offences 138
172 Warrant to search premises 139
173 Warrant to inspect bank accounts 139
174 Obligation to produce warrant 140
175 Notice of execution of warrant 140
176 Powers and duties of Standards Committee in relation to 141
documents and records
177 Notification to clients of practitioner or former 142
practitioner
178 Power to notify Registrar-General of Land 142
179 Notification of practitioner or former practitioner, part- 143
ner, employer, or director
180 Application to High Court by practitioner, former practi- 144
tioner, related person or entity, partner, employer, or
director
181 Recovery of expenses of Standards Committee 144
182 Application of money in satisfaction of expenses 145
General provisions in relation to Standards Committees
183 Power to appoint committees 146
184 Delegation of functions and powers 146
185 Members, investigators, etc, not personally liable 147
186 Protection and privileges of witnesses 148
187 Privileges and immunities of counsel 148
188 Disclosure of information 148
189 Enforcement of orders 149
Legal Complaints Review Officer
190 Legal Complaints Review Officer 150
191 Criteria for appointment 150
192 Functions of Legal Complaints Review Officer 151
193 Right of review 151
194 Applicants in relation to complaints 151
195 Applicants in relation to inquiries 152
196 Applicants in relation to power to intervene 152
7
Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 2006 No 1
197 Applicants in other cases 153
198 Applications for review 153
199 Obligation to conduct review 154
200 Avoidance of unnecessary formality 154
201 Postponement for consideration of negotiation, concilia- 154
tion, or mediation
Powers of Legal Complaints Review Officer
202 General powers 156
203 Scope of review of final determination 156
204 Power to obtain information 156
205 Power to decline to make further inquiry or investigation 157
Procedure
206 Proceedings of Legal Complaints Review Officer 157
207 Evidence 158
208 Disclosure of evidence and information to parties 158
209 Power to direct reconsideration of complaints, matters, 159
or decisions
210 Order for payment of costs 159
211 Powers exercisable on review 160
212 Laying of charge with Disciplinary Tribunal 161
213 Obligation to report outcomes and recommendations 162
214 Adverse comment 162
215 Enforcement of orders for costs or expenses 162
Cost recovery
216 Purpose 163
217 Levy 163
218 Legal Complaints Review Officer Trust Account 164
219 Special circumstances levy 165
220 Payment of levies 165
221 Recovery of levy 165
Annual reports
222 Reports in relation to cost recovery 166
223 Annual report 166
224 Contents of annual report 167
225 Further provisions relating to Legal Complaints Review 167
Officer
New Zealand Lawyers and Conveyancers
Disciplinary Tribunal
226 New Zealand Lawyers and Conveyancers Disciplinary 167
Tribunal
227 Functions of Disciplinary Tribunal 167
228 Membership of Disciplinary Tribunal 168
229 Disciplinary Tribunal may sit in divisions 169
8
2006 No 1 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006
230 Appointment of chairperson and deputy chairperson 170
231 Responsibilities of chairperson 170
232 Deputy chairperson and acting deputy chairperson 170
233 Appointment of other members 171
234 Constitution for proceedings 172
235 Quorum 173
Procedure
236 Rules of natural justice 173
237 Representation before Disciplinary Tribunal 174
238 Hearings to be in public 174
239 Evidence 174
240 Restrictions on publication 175
241 Charges that may be brought before Disciplinary 176
Tribunal
242 Orders that may be made where charge proved 177
243 Power to refer bill of costs to Standards Committee 178
244 Making of order for striking off roll, cancellation of 179
registration, or suspension from practice
245 Interim suspension from practice 179
246 Restoration of name to roll or register 181
247 Revocation of order in respect of employee 181
248 Consent to employ 182
249 Order for payment of costs 183
250 Rules of procedure 184
251 Contempt of Disciplinary Tribunal 184
252 Power of Disciplinary Tribunal to determine procedure 185
Appeals
253 Appeal against order or decision of Disciplinary Tribunal 185
254 Appeal to Court of Appeal on question of law 186
255 Order for striking off, cancellation of registration, resto- 186
ration, or suspension to be filed in High Court
Miscellaneous provisions
256 Notice of order for striking off, cancellation of registra- 187
tion, restoration, or suspension to be published in
Gazette
257 Reimbursement of costs of hearing 189
258 Enforcement of orders of Disciplinary Tribunal 190
259 Annual report 190
260 Further provisions relating to Disciplinary Tribunal 191
Offences
261 Failure to comply with summons 191
262 Obstruction 191
263 Publication 192
9
Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 2006 No 1
264 Liability of principal for acts of agent, etc 192
265 Time for laying information 192
Jurisdiction of High Court and Court of Appeal
266 Lawyer's name may be struck off on application to High 193
Court
267 High Court may dismiss application, or reserve case for 193
Court of Appeal
268 Inherent jurisdiction of High Court 194
269 Notice of order for striking off or suspension to be 194
published in Gazette
270 Jurisdiction of High Court not limited 194
General provisions
271 Legal professional privilege 194
272 Protection of New Zealand Law Society and New 194
Zealand Society of Conveyancers and other persons
Part 8
New Zealand Council of Legal Education
273 Continuation and renaming of Council 195
274 Functions 196
275 Powers 197
276 Consultation with New Zealand Law Society 197
277 Levies 198
278 Power of Council to make regulations 198
279 Power of Council to make rules 200
280 Power to appoint committees 200
281 Institute of Professional Legal Studies 201
282 Membership 202
283 Term of office 203
284 Extraordinary vacancies 203
285 Proceedings not affected by vacancies 204
286 Chairperson 204
287 Further provisions applying to Council 204
288 Annual report 205
Part 9
Lawyers and Conveyancers Special Fund
289 Lawyers and Conveyancers Special Fund 205
290 Money payable into Fund 205
291 Separate bank account 206
292 Management Committee 206
293 Membership of Management Committee 206
294 Meetings of Management Committee 206
295 Bank accounts 207
296 Investment of money 207
10
2006 No 1 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006
297 Audit of accounts 207
298 Distribution of Special Fund 207
299 Nominated trust accounts 208
300 Money required to be held in nominated trust account 208
301 Interest to be payable on nominated trust account 209
302 Banks to pay interest on nominated trust accounts to 210
Special Fund
303 Practitioners, incorporated firms, and banks not liable to 210
account to client for interest payable on nominated trust
account
Part 10
Fidelity Funds
304 Purpose 211
305 Interpretation 211
306 Claim event 213
307 Lawyers to whom, and incorporated law firms to which, 213
this Part applies
308 Conveyancing practitioners to whom, and incorporated 214
conveyancing firms to which, this Part applies
309 Lawyers' Fidelity Fund 215
310 Conveyancing Practitioners' Fidelity Fund 216
311 Rules 216
312 Contributions to Lawyers' Fidelity Fund 218
313 Contributions to Conveyancing Practitioners' Fidelity 218
Fund
314 Power of New Zealand Law Society to impose 219
extraordinary levy
315 Power of New Zealand Society of Conveyancers to 220
impose extraordinary levy
316 Contributions and levies 221
317 Election not to receive money or other valuable property 221
in trust
318 Making, expiration, and revocation of election under 222
section 317
319 Offence 222
320 Application of Lawyers' Fidelity Fund 223
321 Application of Conveyancing Practitioners' Fidelity 223
Fund
322 No compensation in respect of money instructed to be 224
invested
323 Advances from fidelity fund for purposes of this Part 226
324 Claims against fidelity fund 227
325 Defences to claims against fund 227
326 Rights of subrogation 227
11
Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 2006 No 1
327 Money recovered by claimants to be held in trust if 228
rights of subrogation apply
328 Provisions applicable if fund insufficient to satisfy 228
claims
329 Power to rule off fund 229
330 Consequences of rule off 230
331 Regulatory society may enter into contracts of insurance 231
332 Application of insurance money 232
Part 11
Miscellaneous provisions
Conditional fee agreements
333 Definitions 232
334 Conditional fee agreements 233
335 Exclusions 234
336 Practice rules in relation to conditional fee agreements 234
Unclaimed money in trust account
337 Unclaimed money in trust account 234
Protection of Councils of New Zealand Law Society and
New Zealand Society of Conveyancers and other persons
338 Councils and members, etc, not personally liable 235
Regulations
339 Regulations 236
Amendments to Real Estate Agents Act 1976
340 Meaning of real estate agent 236
341 Repeal 237
Amendments to Land Transfer Act 1952
342 Interpretation 237
343 Correctness of instrument to be certified 238
344 Who may give certification 238
345 Recovery of compensation paid and costs in case of 238
fraud
Amendments to Land Transfer (Computer Registers and
Electronic Lodgement) Amendment Act 2002
346 Interpretation 238
347 Power to make electronic lodgement compulsory 239
Amendments to other enactments
348 Amendments to other enactments 239
Repeals
349 Repeals 239
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2006 No 1 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006
Transitional provisions in respect of complaints and
disciplinary proceedings
350 Prohibition on complaints and investigations under Law 239
Practitioners Act 1982
351 Complaints about conduct before commencement of 240
section
352 Penalty 241
353 Continuation of disciplinary proceedings and certain 241
other proceedings
354 Continuation of Lay Observers 242
355 Exercise by Legal Complaints Review Officer of role of 242
Lay Observer
356 Exercise by Lawyers Standards Committee of role of 243
complaints committee
357 Exercise by Lawyers Standards Committee of role of 243
District Disciplinary Tribunal
358 Exercise by New Zealand Lawyers and Conveyancers 244
Disciplinary Tribunal of role of New Zealand Law Practitioners
Disciplinary Tribunal
359 Appeal from decision of District Disciplinary Tribunal or 244
Lawyers Standards Committee exercising powers of District
Disciplinary Tribunal
360 Appeal from decision of New Zealand Law Practitioners 245
Disciplinary Tribunal or New Zealand Lawyers and
Conveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal
361 Revision of practitioner's bill of costs 246
Transitional provision relating to Law Society
inspectorate
362 Law Society inspectorate 247
Transitional provisions relating to Solicitors' Fidelity
Guarantee Fund
363 Continuation of Part IX of Law Practitioners Act 1982 249
364 Money payable into Solicitors' Fidelity Guarantee Fund 249
365 Claims in relation to Solicitors' Fidelity Guarantee Fund 249
366 Public notice of last day for making claims 250
367 Winding up of Solicitors' Fidelity Guarantee Fund 250
368 Completion of determination of claim 251
369 Application of Solicitors' Fidelity Guarantee Fund on 252
winding up
370 Repeal of provisions relating to Solicitors' Fidelity 252
Guarantee Fund
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Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 2006 No 1
Transitional provisions relating to barristers and
solicitors
371 Persons deemed to have been admitted as barristers and 253
solicitors
Transitional provisions relating to dissolution of District
Law Societies
372 Continuation and dissolution of District Law Societies 253
373 Assets and liabilities of District Law Societies 253
374 Power to transfer assets of District Law Society library 254
375 Power of incorporated society to provide law library 255
376 Power to contribute to funding of law libraries 255
377 Members to have no right to property on dissolution of 255
incorporated society
378 Consequential provisions in relation to assets, money, 256
and property
379 Records relating to regulatory activities 256
380 Administration of solicitor's trust account 258
381 Solicitor's records and documents 258
382 Certain matters not affected by transfer of assets and 259
liabilities
383 Employees 259
384 Final accounts of District Law Societies 261
385 References to President of District Law Society 261
Transitional provisions relating to New Zealand Law
Society
386 Members of New Zealand Law Society 261
387 Officers of New Zealand Law Society 261
Transitional provisions relating to landbrokers
388 Rights of landbrokers 262
389 Repeal 263
Transitional provision relating to New Zealand Society
of Conveyancers
390 Exercise of regulatory functions of New Zealand Society 263
of Conveyancers
Transitional provisions relating to Disciplinary Tribunal
391 Appointment of members of Disciplinary Tribunal 264
392 Quorum 264
393 Power to alter period 265
Schedule 1 266
Provisions requiring appointment of agent to conduct
sole practice or act as board of incorporated firm
Schedule 2 279
14
2006 No 1 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 Part 1 s 3
Provisions applying in relation to investigations
under section 109
Schedule 3 284
Provisions applying in relation to Legal Complaints
Review Officer
Schedule 4 290
Provisions applying in relation to
Disciplinary Tribunal
Schedule 5 296
Provisions applying in relation to New Zealand
Council of Legal Education
Schedule 6 303
Enactments amended
Schedule 7 311
Enactments repealed
The Parliament of New Zealand enacts as follows:
1 Title
This Act is the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006.
2 Commencement
This Act comes into force on a date to be appointed by the Governor-General by Order in Council; and 1 or more orders
may be made appointing different dates for different provisions.
Part 1
Preliminary provisions
3 Purposes
(1) The purposes of this Act are-
(a) to maintain public confidence in the provision of legal services and conveyancing services:
(b) to protect the consumers of legal services and conveyancing services:
(c) to recognise the status of the legal profession and to establish the new profession of conveyancing
practitioner.
(2) To achieve those purposes, this Act, among other things,-
15
Part 1 s 3 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 2006 No 1
(a) reforms the law relating to lawyers:
(b) provides for a more responsive regulatory regime in relation to lawyers and conveyancers:
(c) enables conveyancing to be carried out both-
(i) by lawyers; and
(ii) by conveyancing practitioners:
(d) states the fundamental obligations with which, in the public interest, all lawyers and all conveyancing practitioners
must comply in providing regulated services:
(e) repeals the Law Practitioners Act 1982.
4 Fundamental obligations of lawyers
Every lawyer who provides regulated services must, in the course of his or her practice, comply with the following fundamental
obligations:
(a) the obligation to uphold the rule of law and to facilitate the administration of justice in New Zealand:
(b) the obligation to be independent in providing regulated services to his or her clients:
(c) the obligation to act in accordance with all fiduciary duties and duties of care owed by lawyers to their clients:
(d) the obligation to protect, subject to his or her overriding duties as an officer of the High Court and to his or her
duties under any enactment, the interests of his or her clients.
5 Fundamental obligations of conveyancing practitioners
Every conveyancing practitioner who provides regulated services must, in the course of his or her practice, comply with
the following fundamental obligations:
(a) the obligation to be independent in providing regulated services to his or her clients:
(b) the obligation to act in accordance with all fiduciary duties and duties of care owed by conveyancing practitioners
to their clients:
(c) the obligation to protect, subject to his or her duties under any enactment, the interests of his or her clients.
16
2006 No 1 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 Part 1 s 6
6 Interpretation
In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-
bank means a registered bank within the meaning of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989 that is carrying on in
New Zealand the business of banking banker means the manager or other person for the time being
in charge of the office of a bank in which any account is kept barrister means a person enrolled as a barrister and solicitor of the High Court under or by virtue of this Act and practicing as a barrister, whether or not he or she also practises as a solicitor; and, in relation to any country outside New Zealand, includes, for the purposes of sections 49(3)(a) and 53, any person authorised to exercise in that country functions similar to those exercised by barristers in New Zealand chief executive, in relation to a Crown organisation,-
(a) means the chief executive or principal officer (however described) of that organisation; and
(b) includes,-
(i) in the case of a department, the head of the department and a chief executive appointed under the State Sector Act 1988; and
(ii) in the case of a Crown entity, the chief executive officer of the Crown entity; and
(iii) in the case of the Police of New Zealand, the Commissioner of Police; and
(iv) in the case of the New Zealand Defence Force, the Chief of Defence Force; and
(v) in the case of an Office of Parliament, the head of the office concerned community law centre means a community law centre within
the meaning of section 85 of the Legal Services Act 2000 that is providing community legal services under a contract
entered into by the Legal Services Agency pursuant to section 87 of that Act company means a company within the meaning of the Companies Act 1993 complaint means a complaint under section 132 complaints service means a complaints service established
under section 121 17
Part 1 s 6 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 2006 No 1
conveyancer means a person, not being a lawyer or a person acting under the supervision of a lawyer, who provides conveyancing
services Conveyancers Society inspectorate means the inspectorate established by the New Zealand Society of Conveyancers
pursuant to regulations made under section 115 conveyancing-
(a) means-
(i) legal work carried out for the purpose of effecting or documenting any transaction or prospective transaction that does or would create, vary, transfer, or extinguish a legal or equitable estate, interest, or right in any real property; and
(ii) legal work carried out for the purpose of effecting or documenting a sale or purchase of a business, whether or not land is involved; and
(b) includes legal work carried out for the purpose of effecting or documenting-
(i) a lease of land; or
(ii) the grant of a mortgage or charge over any interest in land; or
(iii) the creation of a trust affecting any real property or any interest in land; and
(c) includes any legal services that are incidental to, or ancillary to, any work of a kind described in paragraph
(a) or paragraph (b); and
(d) includes, in particular, the presenting of any instrument for registration under the Land Transfer Act 1952 or the
Deeds Registration Act 1908 and the carrying out of any other work required by either of those Acts to be performed by, or on behalf of, persons seeking to effect registration of instruments; but
(e) does not include the legal work involved in the preparation or drafting of a will; and
(f) despite paragraph (d), does not include the work (not being legal work) involved in an agent of a practitioner
or incorporated firm presenting an instrument for registration under the Land Transfer Act 1952 or the Deeds Registration Act 1908
18
2006 No 1 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 Part 1 s 6
conveyancing practitioner means a person who holds a current practising certificate issued by the New Zealand Society
of Conveyancers Conveyancing Practitioners' Fidelity Fund means the fund established, pursuant to section 310, by practice rules made by
the New Zealand Society of Conveyancers Conveyancing Practitioners Standards Committee means a Conveyancing Practitioners Standards Committee established pursuant to section 127 conveyancing services means services that a person provides
by carrying out conveyancing for any other person Council, in Part 8 and Schedule 5, means the New Zealand Council of Legal Education
country includes every territory for whose international relations the Government of that country is responsible course of study-
(a) means,-
(i) in relation to lawyers, the course of study for any prescribed examination that is a qualification for
admission as a barrister and solicitor of the High Court; and
(ii) in relation to conveyancers, the course of study for any examination that is a qualification for registration as a conveyancer; and
(b) includes, in relation to any course of study to which paragraph (a)(i) or paragraph (a) (ii) applies, the structure of the course, the prescriptions for each subject, any prerequisites to the course or to any of the subjects of study in the course, and the examinations for the
subjects
Crown entity has the meaning given to it by section 7(1) of the Crown Entities Act 2004 Crown organisation means a Crown entity, department, or government-related organization department has the meaning given to it by section 2(1) of the
Public Finance Act 1989 director, in relation to an incorporated firm, means a director as defined in section 126 of the Companies Act 1993
19
Part 1 s 6 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 2006 No 1
direct supervision has,-
(a) in relation to a lawyer who provides regulated services, the meaning given to it by the practice rules of the New
Zealand Law Society; and
(b) in relation to a conveyancing practitioner who provides
regulated services, the meaning given to it by the practice
rules of the New Zealand Society of Conveyancers
Disciplinary Tribunal means the New Zealand Lawyers and
Conveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal established by
section 226
document, in relation to a practitioner, includes-
(a) any paper, deed, security, or instrument (including a
negotiable instrument); and
(b) any postal article within the meaning of the Postal Services
Act 1998, including any such article delivered or
to be delivered to any private box used for the purposes
of the practitioner's practice; and
(c) any document delivered or to be delivered to a document
exchange box used for the purposes of the practitioner's
practice; and
(d) any reproduction or copy of a document; and
(e) any information recorded or stored by means of any
tape-recorder, computer, or other device, and any
material subsequently derived from information so
recorded or stored
employee includes,-
(a) in relation to the New Zealand Defence Force, a member
of the Armed Forces; and
(b) in relation to the Police of New Zealand, a member of
the police
executive director of the New Zealand Law Society means
the person for the time being appointed to hold that position
by the Council of the New Zealand Law Society
20
2006 No 1 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 Part 1 s 6
fundamental obligations means,-
(a) in relation to lawyers, the fundamental obligations set
out in section 4; and
(b) in relation to conveyancing practitioners, the fundamental
obligations set out in section 5
government-related organisation has the meaning given to
it by section 4 of the Crown Organisations (Criminal Liability)
Act 2002
High Court means the High Court of New Zealand; and
includes a Judge of that Court
incorporated conveyancing firm means, subject to sections
15 and 16, a company that-
(a) provides to the public services that are, in relation to a
conveyancing practitioner, regulated services; and
(b) has as its directors no persons other than conveyancing
practitioners who are actively involved in the provision
by the body corporate of regulated services; and
(c) has as its shareholders, in respect of shares that confer
voting rights, no persons other than-
(i) conveyancing practitioners of the kind described
in paragraph (b); or
(ii) persons who are administrators of the estates of
persons who, at the time of their death, were
conveyancing practitioners of the kind described
in paragraph (b); and
(d) has as its shareholders, in respect of shares that do not
confer voting rights, no persons other than-
(i) conveyancing practitioners of the kind described
in paragraph (b); or
(ii) persons who are relatives of conveyancing practitioners
of the kind described in paragraph (b); or
(iii) persons who are administrators of the estates of
persons who, at the time of their death, were
shareholders of the kind described in subparagraph
(i) or subparagraph (ii)
incorporated firm means an incorporated conveyancing firm
or an incorporated law firm
incorporated law firm means, subject to sections 15 and 16,
a company that-
(a) provides to the public services that are, in relation to a
lawyer, regulated services; and
21
Part 1 s 6 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 2006 No 1
(b) has as its directors no persons other than lawyers who
are actively involved in the provision by the body corporate
of regulated services; and
(c) has as its shareholders, in respect of shares that confer
voting rights, no persons other than-
(i) lawyers of the kind described in paragraph (b); or
(ii) persons who are administrators of the estates of
persons who, at the time of their death, were
lawyers of the kind described in paragraph (b);
and
(d) has as its shareholders, in respect of shares that do not
confer voting rights, no persons other than-
(i) lawyers of the kind described in paragraph (b); or
(ii) persons who are relatives of lawyers of the kind
described in paragraph (b); or
(iii) persons who are administrators of the estates of
persons who, at the time of their death, were
shareholders of the kind described in subparagraph
(i) or subparagraph (ii)
investigator means an investigator appointed under
section 144
Law Society inspectorate means the inspectorate established
by the New Zealand Law Society pursuant to regulations
made under section 115
lawyer means a person who holds a current practising certificate
as a barrister or as a barrister and solicitor
Lawyers and Conveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal means
the New Zealand Lawyers and Conveyancers Disciplinary
Tribunal established by section 226
Lawyers' Fidelity Fund means the fund established, pursuant
to section 309, by practice rules made by the New Zealand
Law Society
Lawyers Standards Committee means a Lawyers Standards
Committee established pursuant to section 126
lay member, in relation to the Disciplinary Tribunal, means a
member of the Disciplinary Tribunal who holds office under
section 228(c)
Legal Complaints Review Officer means the Legal Complaints
Review Officer appointed under section 190
22
2006 No 1 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 Part 1 s 6
legal services means services that a person provides by carrying
out legal work for any other person
Legal Services Agency means the agency established by the
Legal Services Act 2000
legal work includes-
(a) the reserved areas of work:
(b) advice in relation to any legal or equitable rights or
obligations:
(c) the preparation or review of any document that-
(i) creates, or provides evidence of, legal or equitable
rights or obligations; or
(ii) creates, varies, transfers, extinguishes, mortgages,
or charges any legal or equitable title in
any property:
(d) mediation, conciliation, or arbitration services:
(e) any work that is incidental to any of the work described
in paragraphs (a) to (d)
Management Committee means the management committee
established for the Special Fund by section 292(1)
mental or physical condition means any mental or physical
condition or impairment; and includes, without limitation, a
condition or impairment caused by alcohol or drug abuse
Minister means the Minister of the Crown who, under the
authority of any warrant or with the authority of the Prime
Minister, is for the time being responsible for the administration
of this Act
misconduct has,-
(a) in relation to a lawyer (whether in practice on his or her
own account or not), the meaning given to it by section
7; and
(b) in relation to an incorporated law firm, the meaning
given to it by section 7; and
(c) in relation to a conveyancing practitioner (whether in
practice on his or her own account or not), the meaning
given to it by section 8; and
(d) in relation to an incorporated conveyancing firm, the
meaning given to it by section 8; and
(e) in relation to a lawyer who is an employee, not only the
meaning given to it by section 7, but also the meaning
given to it by section 9(1); and
23
Part 1 s 6 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 2006 No 1
(f) in relation to a conveyancing practitioner who is an
employee not only the meaning given to it by section 8
but also the meaning given to it by section 9(2); and
(g) in relation to a person who is not a practitioner but who
is an employee of a practitioner or an incorporated firm,
the meaning given to it by section 11
money includes-
(a) bank notes and other currency, being any negotiable
instruments used or circulated, or intended for use or
circulation, as currency; and
(b) postal notes and money orders; and
(c) promissory notes and bills of exchange,-
whether of New Zealand or any other country
New Zealand Law Society means the society continued in
existence by section 63
New Zealand Society of Conveyancers means the society
established by section 77
nominated trust account means a trust account nominated
under section 299
Office of Parliament has the meaning given to it by section
2(1) of the Public Finance Act 1989
patent attorney means a person registered as a patent attorney
under section 100 of the Patents Act 1953
postal operator means a person for the time being registered
as a postal operator under the Postal Services Act 1998
practice rules means rules made under section 94
practising certificate means,-
(a) in relation to a lawyer, a practising certificate issued
under section 39(1) by the New Zealand Law Society;
and
(b) in relation to a conveyancing practitioner, a practising
certificate issued under section 39(2) by the New
Zealand Society of Conveyancers
practitioner means a lawyer or a conveyancing practitioner,
as the case may be
printed form includes-
(a) a form that is provided by a duplication or reproduction
process, by printing from an electronic file or record, or
by any similar process; and
24
2006 No 1 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 Part 1 s 6
(b) a form-
(i) which is contained in an electronic file or record;
and
(ii) which can be filled in, in whole or in part, before
being transmitted electronically or being reproduced
by printing it from that electronic file or
record
record includes-
(a) any file, register, ledger, book of account, or passbook,
and any reproduction or copy of any of them or of any
entry in any of them; and
(b) any apparatus or equipment in or on which information
is recorded, stored, or embodied in any form so as to be
capable of being retrieved, reproduced, or processed by
any means; and
(c) any material by means of which information is supplied
to, or derived from, any such apparatus or equipment
registered conveyancer means a person who is registered as
a conveyancer under rules made under section 81(2)(a)
Registrar means a Registrar of the High Court; and includes a
Deputy Registrar
regulated services means,-
(a) in relation to a lawyer or an incorporated law firm,-
(i) legal services; and
(ii) conveyancing services; and
(iii) services that a lawyer provides by undertaking
the work of a real estate agent; and
(b) in relation to a conveyancing practitioner or an incorporated
conveyancing firm,-
(i) conveyancing services; and
(ii) services that a conveyancing practitioner provides
by undertaking the work of a real estate
agent
regulated trust account, in relation to a practitioner,-
(a) means a trust account required by this Act, or by any
rules made under this Act, to be kept-
(i) by the practitioner or a related person or entity; or
(ii) by any incorporated firm of which the practitioner
is a director or shareholder; and
(b) includes any bank account in which money belonging
to a client of the practitioner, of a related person or
25
Part 1 s 6 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 2006 No 1
entity, or of an incorporated firm of which the practitioner
is a director or shareholder is held if that money is held-
(i) by, or in the name of, the practitioner or any such incorporated firm; or
(ii) by, or in the name of, any person who is, in relation to the practitioner, a related person or
entity; or
(iii) by, or in the name of, any agent, or employee of the practitioner or of any such incorporated firm;
or
(iv) by, or in the names of, both the practitioner or any
such incorporated firm and any person described
in subparagraph (ii) or subparagraph (iii)
related entity means,-
(a) in relation to a lawyer, any body (including a partnership or body corporate) on behalf of which, or in association with which, the lawyer provides, whether in his or her capacity as an employee, shareholder, or director or in any other capacity, regulated services to the public;
and
(b) in relation to a conveyancing practitioner, any body
(including a partnership or body corporate) on behalf of
which, or in association with which, the conveyancing
practitioner provides, whether in his or her capacity as
an employee, shareholder, or director or in any other
capacity, regulated services to the public
related person or entity means, in relation to a
practitioner,-
(a) a related entity; or
(b) any person who practises in partnership with the practitioner;
or
(c) any person who-
(i) employs the practitioner to provide regulated services
to the public; or
(ii) is a director or shareholder of an incorporated law
firm or incorporated conveyancing firm in which
the practitioner practices
relative, in relation to a conveyancing practitioner or lawyer,
means, for the purposes of the definitions in this section of
26
2006 No 1 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 Part 1 s 6
incorporated conveyancing firm and incorporated law
firm, any of the following:
(a) a spouse, civil union partner, or de facto partner of the
conveyancing practitioner or lawyer:
(b) a parent or grandparent of the conveyancing practitioner
or lawyer:
(c) a step-parent of the conveyancing practitioner or
lawyer:
(d) a brother, sister, half-brother, or half-sister of the conveyancing
practitioner or lawyer:
(e) a child of the conveyancing practitioner or lawyer:
(f) a step-child of the conveyancing practitioner or lawyer:
(g) a parent of the conveyancing practitioner's or lawyer's
spouse, civil union partner, or de facto partner
reserved areas of work means the work carried out by a
person-
(a) in giving legal advice to any other person in relation to
the direction or management of-
(i) any proceedings that the other person is considering
bringing, or has decided to bring, before any
New Zealand court or New Zealand tribunal; or
(ii) any proceedings before any New Zealand court
or New Zealand tribunal to which the other person
is a party or is likely to become a party; or
(b) in appearing as an advocate for any other person before
any New Zealand court or New Zealand tribunal; or
(c) in representing any other person involved in any proceedings
before any New Zealand court or New
Zealand tribunal; or
(d) in giving legal advice or in carrying out any other action
that, by section 21F of the Property (Relationships) Act
1976 or by any provision of any other enactment, is
required to be carried out by a lawyer
roll means the roll of barristers and solicitors kept by any
Registrar under this Act
shareholder, in relation to an incorporated firm, means a
shareholder as defined in section 96 of the Companies Act
1993
solicitor means a person enrolled as a barrister and solicitor of
the High Court under, or by virtue of, this Act and practising
as a solicitor, whether or not he or she also practises as a
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Part 1 s 6 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 2006 No 1
barrister; and, in relation to any country outside New Zealand,
includes, for the purposes of sections 49(3)(a) and 53, any
person authorised to exercise in that country functions similar
to those exercised by solicitors in New Zealand
Special Fund means the fund continued in existence by
section 289 and now known as the Lawyers and Conveyancers
Special Fund
Standards Committee means a Lawyers Standards Committee
or a Conveyancers Standards Committee
statutory officer means a person-
(a) holding or performing the duties of an office established
by an enactment; or
(b) performing duties expressly conferred on that person by
virtue of his or her office by an enactment; or
(c) holding office as the chief executive of a Crown
organisation
trust account-
(a) means, in relation to a practitioner or incorporated firm,
any trust account at a bank in New Zealand that is a trust
account in the name of that practitioner or incorporated
firm; and
(b) includes, in relation to a practitioner, any trust account
at a bank in New Zealand that-
(i) is in the name of a firm in which that practitioner
is a partner or is held out to be a partner; or
(ii) is in the name of an incorporated firm of which
that practitioner is a director or shareholder
trust account records-
(a) means records relating to a trust account; and
(b) includes any information which relates to a trust
account and which is recorded or stored by means of
any tape-recorder, computer, or other device, and any
material subsequently derived from information so
recorded or stored
trustee company means a trustee company within the meaning
of the Trustee Companies Act 1967
unsatisfactory conduct has,-
(a) in relation to a lawyer (whether in practice on his or her
own account or not), the meaning given to it by section
12; and
28
2006 No 1 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 Part 1 s 7
(b) in relation to an incorporated law firm, the meaning
given to it by section 12; and
(c) in relation to a conveyancing practitioner (whether in
practice on his or her own account or not), the meaning
given to it by section 13; and
(d) in relation to an incorporated conveyancing firm, the
meaning given to it by section 13; and
(e) in relation to a person who is not a practitioner but who
is an employee of a practitioner or an incorporated firm,
the meaning given to it by section 14.
Compare: 1982 No 123 ss 2, 65(4)
7 Misconduct defined in relation to lawyer and
incorporated law firm
(1) In this Act, misconduct, in relation to a lawyer or an incorporated
law firm,-
(a) means conduct of the lawyer or incorporated law firm
that occurs at a time when he or she or it is providing
regulated services and is conduct-
(i) that would reasonably be regarded by lawyers of
good standing as disgraceful or dishonourable; or
(ii) that consists of a wilful or reckless contravention
of any provision of this Act or of any regulations
or practice rules made under this Act that apply to
the lawyer or incorporated law firm or of any
other Act relating to the provision of regulated
services; or
(iii) that consists of a wilful or reckless failure on the
part of the lawyer, or, in the case of an incorporated
law firm, on the part of a lawyer who is
actively involved in the provision by the incorporated
law firm of regulated services, to comply
with a condition or restriction to which a practising
certificate held by the lawyer, or the lawyer so
actively involved, is subject; or
(iv) that consists of the charging of grossly excessive
costs for legal work carried out by the lawyer or
incorporated law firm; and
(b) includes-
(i) conduct of the lawyer or incorporated law firm
that is misconduct under subsection (2) or subsection
(3); and
29
Part 1 s 7 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 2006 No 1
(ii) conduct of the lawyer or incorporated law firm
which is unconnected with the provision of regulated
services by the lawyer or incorporated law
firm but which would justify a finding that the
lawyer or incorporated law firm is not a fit and
proper person or is otherwise unsuited to engage
in practice as a lawyer or an incorporated law
firm.
(2) A lawyer or an incorporated law firm is guilty of misconduct
if, at a time when he or she or it is providing regulated
services, and without the consent of the High Court or of the
Disciplinary Tribunal, the lawyer or incorporated law firm
knowingly employs, or permits to act as a clerk or otherwise,
in relation to the provision of regulated services, any person
who, to the knowledge of the lawyer or incorporated law
firm,-
(a) is under suspension from practice as a barrister or as a
solicitor or as a conveyancing practitioner; or
(b) has had his or her name struck off the roll of barristers
and solicitors of the High Court; or
(c) has had his or her registration as a conveyancing practitioner
cancelled by an order made under this Act; or
(d) is disqualified, by an order made under section
242(1)(h), from employment in connection with a practitioner's
or incorporated firm's practice.
(3) A person is guilty of misconduct if that person, being a lawyer
or an incorporated law firm, shares, with any person other than
another lawyer or incorporated law firm, the income from any
business involving the provision of regulated services to the
public.
(4) Despite subsection (3), a lawyer or an incorporated law firm is
not guilty of misconduct under that subsection by reason only
of sharing with a patent attorney (in the circumstances, and in
accordance with any conditions, prescribed by the practice
rules) the income from any business involving the provision
of regulated services to the public.
(5) Despite subsection (3), neither an incorporated law firm nor a
lawyer who is actively involved in the provision by an incorporated
law firm of regulated services is guilty of misconduct
under that subsection by reason only of the incorporated law
firm making a distribution to shareholders of that firm.
30
2006 No 1 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 Part 1 s 8
8 Misconduct defined in relation to conveyancing
practitioner and incorporated conveyancing firm
(1) In this Act, misconduct, in relation to a conveyancing practitioner
or an incorporated conveyancing firm,-
(a) means conduct of the conveyancing practitioner or
incorporated conveyancing firm that occurs at a time
when he or she or it is providing regulated services and
is conduct-
(i) that would reasonably be regarded by conveyancing
practitioners of good standing as disgraceful
or dishonourable; or
(ii) that consists of a wilful or reckless contravention
of any provision of this Act or of any regulations
or practice rules made under this Act that apply to
the conveyancing practitioner or incorporated
conveyancing firm or of any other Act relating to
the provision of regulated services; or
(iii) that consists of a wilful or reckless failure, on the
part of the conveyancing practitioner, or, in the
case of an incorporated conveyancing firm, on
the part of a conveyancing practitioner who is
actively involved in the provision by the incorporated
conveyancing firm of regulated services,
to comply with a condition or restriction to which
a practising certificate held by the conveyancing
practitioner, or the conveyancing practitioner so
actively involved, is subject; or
(iv) that consists of the charging of grossly excessive
costs for conveyancing carried out by the conveyancing
practitioner or incorporated conveyancing
firm; and
(b) includes-
(i) conduct of the conveyancing practitioner or
incorporated conveyancing firm that is misconduct
under subsection (2) or subsection (3); and
(ii) conduct by the conveyancing practitioner or
incorporated conveyancing firm which is unconnected
with the provision of regulated services by
the conveyancing practitioner or incorporated
conveyancing firm but which would justify a
finding that the conveyancing practitioner or
incorporated conveyancing firm is not a fit and
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Part 1 s 8 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 2006 No 1
proper person or is otherwise unsuited to engage
in practice as a conveyancing practitioner or an
incorporated conveyancing firm.
(2) A conveyancing practitioner or incorporated conveyancing
firm is guilty of misconduct if, at a time when he or she or it is
providing regulated services, and without the consent of the
High Court or of the Disciplinary Tribunal, the conveyancing
practitioner or incorporated conveyancing firm knowingly
employs, or permits to act as a clerk or otherwise, in relation
to the provision of regulated services, any person who, to the
knowledge of the conveyancing practitioner or incorporated
conveyancing firm,-
(a) is under suspension from practice as a barrister or as a
solicitor or as a conveyancing practitioner; or
(b) has had his or her name struck off the roll of barristers
and solicitors of the High Court; or
(c) has had his or her registration as a conveyancing practitioner
cancelled by an order made under this Act; or
(d) is disqualified, by an order made under section
242(1)(h), from employment in connection with a practitioner's
or incorporated firm's practice.
(3) A person is guilty of misconduct if that person, being a conveyancing
practitioner or an incorporated conveyancing firm,
shares with any person other than another conveyancing practitioner
or incorporated conveyancing firm, the income from
any business involving the provision of regulated services to
the public.
(4) Despite subsection (3), neither an incorporated conveyancing
firm nor a conveyancing practitioner who is actively involved
in the provision by an incorporated conveyancing firm of
regulated services is guilty of misconduct under that subsection
by reason only of the incorporated conveyancing firm
making a distribution to shareholders of that firm.
9 Misconduct defined in relation to provision of regulated
services by employees
(1) A lawyer is guilty of misconduct who, being an employee,
provides regulated services to the public other than in the
course of his or her employment-
(a) by a lawyer; or
(b) by a partnership comprised entirely of lawyers; or
32
2006 No 1 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 Part 1 s 10
(c) by an incorporated law firm; or
(d) by a community law centre; or
(e) by the Legal Services Agency; or
(f) by Public Trust; or
(g) by the Maori Trustee; or
(h) by a trustee company.
(2) A conveyancing practitioner is guilty of misconduct who,
being an employee, provides regulated services to the public
other than in the course of his or her employment-
(a) by a conveyancing practitioner; or
(b) by a partnership comprised entirely of conveyancing
practitioners; or
(c) by an incorporated conveyancing firm; or
(d) by a lawyer; or
(e) by a partnership comprised entirely of lawyers; or
(f) by an incorporated law firm; or
(g) by Public Trust; or
(h) by the Maori Trustee; or
(i) by a trustee company.
(3) This section is subject to section 10.
10 Exceptions to section 9
(1) Nothing in section 9 prevents-
(a) a lawyer from being employed by a person other than a
person described in paragraphs (a) to (h) of section 9(1);
or
(b) a conveyancing practitioner from being employed by a
person other than a person described in paragraphs (a)
to (i) of section 9(2); or
(c) a lawyer who is employed by a person other than a
person described in paragraphs (a) to (h) of section 9(1)
from providing in the course of his or her employment
regulated services to his or her employer; or
(d) a conveyancing practitioner who is employed by a person
other than a person described in paragraphs (a) to (i)
of section 9(2) from providing in the course of his or her
employment regulated services to his or her employer;
or
(e) a lawyer to whom paragraph (c) of this subsection
applies from assisting or enabling his or her employer to
provide to the public regulated services that are not-
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Part 1 s 10 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 2006 No 1
(i) legal services that come within the definition of
reserved areas of work; or
(ii) services that consist of the drafting, settling, or
revising of any document that is to be filed in
proceedings before any court or tribunal (if the
drafting, settling, or revising of that document by
the employer of the lawyer would contravene
section 26); or
(iii) conveyancing services; or
(iv) services that a lawyer provides by undertaking
the work of a real estate agent.
(2) Nothing in section 9 prevents-
(a) a lawyer who is acting in his or her capacity as a
statutory officer, and not in his or her personal
capacity,-
(i) from providing regulated services to the public in
the discharge of his or her duties, or the exercise
of his or her powers, under any enactment; or
(ii) from doing any thing that is intended to facilitate,
or is conducive or incidental to, the discharge of
the functions conferred on the statutory officer by
any enactment; or
(b) a lawyer who is employed by a Crown organisation or is
an employee of a statutory officer or Crown organisation,
and who is acting in the course of his or her
employment,-
(i) from providing regulated services to the public in
the discharge of any duties, or in the exercise of
any powers, of the Crown organisation or statutory
officer under any enactment; or
(ii) from doing any thing that is intended to facilitate,
or is conducive or incidental to, the discharge of
the functions conferred on the Crown organisation
or statutory officer by any enactment.
(3) Nothing in section 9 prevents a lawyer who is both an
employee and a lawyer practising on his or her own account
from providing regulated services to the public in his or her
capacity as a lawyer practising on his or her own account.
(4) Despite subsections (1) to (3), nothing in section 9 or this
section permits a lawyer who is employed by a person other
than a person described in paragraphs (a) to (h) of section 9(1)
34
2006 No 1 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 Part 1 s 12
to assist or enable his or her employer to provide regulated
services to a person with whom the lawyer has a lawyer and
client relationship.
(5) Nothing in section 9 prevents a lawyer who is not an
employee of a community law centre or citizens advice bureau
from providing legal services to the public under the auspices
of a community law centre or citizens advice bureau.
(6) Nothing in section 9 or this section limits-
(a) the application of section 7 to a lawyer who is an
employee or statutory officer; or
(b) the application of section 8 to a conveyancing practitioner
who is an employee or statutory officer.
11 Misconduct defined in relation to employees who are not
practitioners
In this Act, misconduct, in relation to a person who is not a
practitioner but who is an employee of a practitioner or an
incorporated firm,-
(a) means conduct of the person in the course of his or her
employment by the practitioner or incorporated firm
that would, if it were conduct of a practitioner, render
the practitioner liable to have his or her name struck off
the roll or to have his or her registration as a conveyancing
practitioner cancelled; and
(b) includes conduct of the person which is unconnected
with his or her employment by the practitioner or incorporated
firm but which would justify a finding that the
person is not of good character or is otherwise unsuited
for employment by a practitioner or incorporated firm.
12 Unsatisfactory conduct defined in relation to lawyers
and incorporated law firms
In this Act, unsatisfactory conduct, in relation to a lawyer or
an incorporated law firm, means-
(a) conduct of the lawyer or incorporated law firm that
occurs at a time when he or she or it is providing
regulated services and is conduct that falls short of the
standard of competence and diligence that a member of
the public is entitled to expect of a reasonably competent
lawyer; or
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Part 1 s 12 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 2006 No 1
(b) conduct of the lawyer or incorporated law firm that
occurs at a time when he or she or it is providing
regulated services and is conduct that would be
regarded by lawyers of good standing as being unacceptable,
including-
(i) conduct unbecoming a lawyer or an incorporated
law firm; or
(ii) unprofessional conduct; or
(c) conduct consisting of a contravention of this Act, or of
any regulations or practice rules made under this Act
that apply to the lawyer or incorporated law firm, or of
any other Act relating to the provision of regulated
services (not being a contravention that amounts to
misconduct under section 7); or
(d) conduct consisting of a failure on the part of the lawyer,
or, in the case of an incorporated law firm, on the part of
a lawyer who is actively involved in the provision by
the incorporated law firm of regulated services, to comply
with a condition or restriction to which a practising
certificate held by the lawyer, or the lawyer so actively
involved, is subject (not being a failure that amounts to
misconduct under section 7).
13 Unsatisfactory conduct defined in relation to
conveyancing practitioners and incorporated
conveyancing firms
In this Act, unsatisfactory conduct, in relation to a conveyancing
practitioner or an incorporated conveyancing firm,
means-
(a) conduct of the conveyancing practitioner or incorporated
conveyancing firm that occurs at a time when
he or she or it is providing regulated services and is
conduct that falls short of the standard of competence
and diligence that a member of the public is entitled to
expect of a reasonably competent conveyancing practitioner;
or
(b) conduct of the conveyancing practitioner or incorporated
conveyancing firm that occurs at a time when
he or she or it is providing regulated services and is
conduct that would be regarded by conveyancing practitioners
of good standing as being unacceptable,
including-
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2006 No 1 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 Part 1 s 15
(i) conduct unbecoming a conveyancing practitioner
or an incorporated conveyancing firm; or
(ii) unprofessional conduct; or
(c) conduct consisting of a contravention of this Act, or of
any regulations or practice rules made under this Act
that apply to the conveyancing practitioner or incorporated
conveyancing firm, or of any other Act relating
to the provision of regulated services (not being a contravention
that amounts to misconduct under section 8);
or
(d) conduct consisting of a failure on the part of the conveyancing
practitioner, or, in the case of an incorporated
conveyancing firm, on the part of a conveyancing
practitioner who is actively involved in the
provision by the incorporated conveyancing firm of regulated
services, to comply with a condition or restriction
to which a practising certificate held by the conveyancing
practitioner, or the conveyancing practitioner so
actively involved, is subject (not being a failure that
amounts to misconduct under section 8).
14 Unsatisfactory conduct defined in relation to employees
who are not practitioners
In this Act, unsatisfactory conduct, in relation to a person
who is not a practitioner but who is an employee of a practitioner
or an incorporated firm,-
(a) means conduct of the person in the course of his or her
employment by the practitioner or incorporated firm
that would, if it were conduct of a practitioner, be unsatisfactory
conduct under section 12 or section 13; and
(b) includes conduct consisting of a contravention of this
Act, or of any regulations or practice rules made under
this Act that apply to the person, or of any other Act
relating to the provision of regulated services (not being
a contravention that amounts to misconduct under
section 11).
15 Directors and shareholders of incorporated firms
(1) A company does not cease to be an incorporated firm merely
because a lawyer or conveyancing practitioner who is actively
involved in the provision by the company of regulated services
and who is a director of the company or is both a director
37
Part 1 s 15 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 2006 No 1
and shareholder of the company dies or ceases, temporarily or
permanently, to be actively involved in the provision of regulated
services by the company if,-
(a) in the case where he or she is the only director of the
company or is both the only director and a shareholder
of the company, his or her powers as a director of that
company are exercised or performed-
(i) by the donee of a power of attorney given under,
or treated by clause 12 or clause 19(4) of Schedule
1 as given under, clause 3(1) or clause 5(1) of
Schedule 1; or
(ii) by the alternate of a donee of the kind described
in subparagraph (i); or
(b) in any other case where he or she is a director of the
company or is both a director and shareholder of the
company, at least 1 other lawyer or 1 other conveyancing
practitioner, as the case may require, who is actively
involved in the provision of regulated services by the
company is a director of the company.
(2) A company is not prevented from being an incorporated firm
merely because of the application of any of the provisions of
section 126(1)(b) to (d), (2), or (3) of the Companies Act 1993
to-
(a) a person who, in the case of an incorporated law firm, is
not a lawyer who is actively involved in the provision
by the incorporated law firm of regulated services; or
(b) a person who, in the case of an incorporated conveyancing
firm, is not a conveyancing practitioner who is
actively involved in the provision by that incorporated
conveyancing firm of regulated services.
(3) Subsection (1)(b) is subject to section 16.
16 Shareholders of incorporated firms
(1) This section applies to any person who is a shareholder in a
company that is an incorporated firm and who is qualified to
be such a shareholder by reason of being-
(a) a lawyer or conveyancing practitioner who is actively
involved in the provision of regulated services by the
company; or
(b) a relative of a lawyer or conveyancing practitioner of
the kind described in paragraph (a).
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2006 No 1 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 Part 1 s 18
(2) If, as a result of a lawyer or conveyancing practitioner dying
or ceasing, temporarily or permanently, to be actively
involved in the provision of regulated services by a company
that is an incorporated firm, a person to whom this section
applies would cease to be qualified as a shareholder of that
company, this Act is, unless the lawyer or conveyancing practitioner
is the only director of that company, to be applied in
relation to that company, until the date specified in subsection
(3), as if that person were qualified to be a shareholder of that
company.
(3) The date specified for the purposes of subsection (2) is the
earlier of-
(a) the date on which the shares in the company that are
held by the person to whom this section applies are
disposed of by or on behalf of that person or the administrator
of that person's estate:
(b) the date of the last day of the period of 12 months
beginning with the date on which the lawyer or conveyancing
practitioner ceases to be actively involved in the
provision of regulated services by that company.
17 Liabilities of director or shareholder of incorporated
firm
(1) For the avoidance of doubt, and subject to sections 18 and 19,
a practitioner who is a director or shareholder of an incorporated
firm is not liable, on a joint or several basis, by reason
only of being such a director or shareholder,-
(a) for any act or omission of any other director or shareholder
of the firm; or
(b) for the debts or liabilities of the firm.
(2) Subject to subsection (1), a practitioner who is a director or
shareholder of an incorporated firm is subject to all the professional
obligations to which he or she would be subject if he or
she were in practice on his or her own account.
18 Liability of lawyer principals in respect of pecuniary loss
by reason of theft
(1) If a person suffers pecuniary loss by reason of the theft of any
money or valuable property that has been entrusted to a lawyer
or an incorporated law firm in the course of the lawyer's or
39
Part 1 s 18 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 2006 No 1
incorporated law firm's practice, the persons specified in subsection
(2) are, in addition to the person who committed the
theft, personally liable for that pecuniary loss if the theft was
committed-
(a) by any person who is, in relation to the lawyer, a related
person or entity; or
(b) by any agent, employer, or employee of the lawyer or
incorporated law firm (whether or not that agent,
employer, or employee is also a lawyer); or
(c) by any agent or employee of a person who is, in relation
to the lawyer, a related person or entity (whether or not
that agent or employee is also a lawyer); or
(d) by any partner or director or other person who controls
or manages the incorporated law firm or any body that
is, in relation to the lawyer, a related entity.
(2) The persons who are personally liable under subsection (1) are
as follows:
(a) the lawyer to whom, or the incorporated law firm to
which, the money or other valuable property was
entrusted:
(b) any person who is, in relation to the lawyer referred to
in paragraph (a), a related person or entity:
(c) any person who is a director or shareholder of the incorporated
law firm referred to in paragraph (a).
(3) Despite subsection (2), a person who is a shareholder of the
incorporated law firm referred to in subsection (2)(a) is not
personally liable under subsection (1) if-
(a) that shareholder does not hold any shares in the incorporated
law firm that confer voting rights; and
(b) that shareholder is not a person who is actively involved
in the provision by the incorporated law firm of regulated
services; and
(c) that shareholder is not a person who is an administrator
of the estate of a person who, at the time of his or her
death, was-
(i) a director of the incorporated law firm; or
(ii) a lawyer who was actively involved in the provision
by the incorporated law firm of regulated
services.
40
2006 No 1 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 Part 1 s 19
19 Liability of conveyancing practitioner principals in
respect of pecuniary loss by reason of theft
(1) If a person suffers pecuniary loss by reason of the theft of any
money or valuable property that has been entrusted to a conveyancing
practitioner or an incorporated conveyancing firm
in the course of the conveyancing practitioner's or incorporated
conveyancing firm's practice, the persons specified in
subsection (2) are, in addition to the person who committed
the theft, personally liable for that pecuniary loss if the theft
was committed-
(a) by any person who is, in relation to the conveyancing
practitioner, a related person or entity; or
(b) by any agent, employer, or employee of the conveyancing
practitioner or incorporated conveyancing firm
(whether or not that agent, employer, or employee is
also a conveyancing practitioner); or
(c) by any agent or employee of a person who is, in relation
to the conveyancing practitioner, a related person or
entity (whether or not that agent or employee is also a
conveyancing practitioner); or
(d) by any partner or director or other person who controls
or manages the incorporated conveyancing firm or any
body that is, in relation to the conveyancing practitioner,
a related entity.
(2) The persons who are personally liable under subsection (1) are
as follows:
(a) the conveyancing practitioner to whom, or the incorporated
conveyancing firm to which, the money or other
valuable property was entrusted:
(b) any person who is, in relation to the conveyancing
practitioner referred to in paragraph (a), a related person
or entity:
(c) any person who is a director or shareholder of the incorporated
conveyancing firm referred to in paragraph (a).
(3) Despite subsection (2), a person who is a shareholder of the
incorporated conveyancing firm referred to in subsection
(2)(a) is not personally liable under subsection (1) if-
(a) that shareholder does not hold any shares in the incorporated
conveyancing firm that confer voting rights;
and
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Part 1 s 19 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 2006 No 1
(b) that shareholder is not a person who is actively involved
in the provision by the incorporated conveyancing firm
of regulated services; and
(c) that shareholder is not a person who is an administrator
of the estate of a person who, at the time of his or her
death, was-
(i) a director of the incorporated conveyancing firm;
or
(ii) a conveyancing practitioner who was actively
involved in the provision by the incorporated
conveyancing firm of regulated services.
20 Act to bind the Crown
This Act binds the Crown.
Part 2
Restrictions on provision of legal services and
conveyancing services
Legal services
21 Provision of legal services
(1) A person commits an offence who, not being a lawyer or an
incorporated law firm,-
(a) provides legal services in New Zealand; and
(b) describes himself, herself, or itself as-
(i) a lawyer; or
(ii) a law practitioner; or
(iii) a legal practitioner; or
(iv) a barrister; or
(v) a solicitor; or
(vi) a barrister and solicitor; or
(vii) an attorney-at-law; or
(viii) counsel.
(2) This section is subject to the exceptions set out in sections
25(2) and 27.
22 Misleading descriptions
(1) A person commits an offence who holds himself or herself, or
any other person, out (whether directly or indirectly) as providing
legal services, or as being entitled, qualified, able, or
willing to provide legal services, under the description of
42
2006 No 1 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 Part 2 s 23
lawyer or any of the terms specified in subparagraphs (ii) to
(viii) of section 21(1)(b), if it would be an offence against
section 21 for that person or, as the case may be, that other
person to provide legal services under that description.
(2) A person commits an offence who uses or permits to be used
in connection with that person's name or business or with the
name under which that person carries on business any words,
letters, or symbols that the person intends to cause, or are
reasonably likely to cause, anyone else to believe that the firstmentioned
person or any other person-
(a) is a lawyer; or
(b) holds any type of admission, enrolment, or practising
certificate under this Act,-
unless the first-mentioned person or, as the case requires, that
other person is a lawyer or is admitted or enrolled or holds that
practising certificate.
(3) A person commits an offence who uses or permits to be used
any words, letters, or symbols that the person intends to cause,
or are reasonably likely to cause, anyone else to believe that
the first-mentioned person or any other person possesses a
qualification in law or any branch of the law or possesses
special expertise in any branch of the law, unless the firstmentioned
person or, as the case requires, that other person
holds that qualification or possesses that special expertise.
(4) This section is subject to the exceptions set out in sections
25(2) and 27.
Compare: 1995 No 95 s 10
23 False or misleading representations in relation to supply
of legal services
(1) A person commits an offence who, in connection with the
supply or possible supply of legal services or with the promotion
by any means of the supply or use of legal services,
makes a false or misleading representation that the legal services
are provided, or are to be provided, by, or under the
direct supervision of, a person (being that person or any other
person)-
(a) who is entitled to provide legal services under the
description of lawyer or any other term specified in
subparagraphs (ii) to (viii) of section 21(1)(b); or
43
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